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Federal Constitutional Protection for Marriage: 








II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS REGARDING A FEDERAL MARRIAGE    
        PROTECTION AMENDMENT 
 
III. WHY A FEDERAL MARRIAGE PROTECTION AMENDMENT SHOULD BE  
        ADOPTED 
A. The American People Highly Value the Institution of Conju-
gal Marriage, Believe That It Is in Jeopardy, and Want to 
Adopt Constitutional Protection for Marriage 
B. Many Recent Court Decisions Have Attempted to Redefine 
Marriage or Mandate Marriage-like Legal Status of Same-
sex Couples 
C. Explicit Protection for Marriage and Family in National 
Constitutions Is the Global Norm 
1. Substantive Constitutional Protection for Marriage 
Is Common 
2. Constitutions of Nations with Federal Governments 
Protect Marriage and Families 
D. Express Protection for Marriage in International Covenants, 
Treaties, Declarations and Multi-national Charters Also Is 
the Norm 
E. A Federal Marriage Protection Amendment Is the Best Hope 
to Preserve Federalism in Family Law 
 ∗ Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. Presented at the 
Symposium on A Federal Marriage Protection Amendment at J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham 
Young University, September 9, 2005. Parts of this paper were presented earlier at the Federalism 
and the Law of Marriage Conference at Harvard Law School, August 26-27, 2005, and at the Sym-
posium on State Marriage Amendments at Georgia State University College of Law, April 16, 2005. 
The paper presented at the Symposium on State Marriage Amendments is being published as State 
Marriage Amendments: Developments, Precedents and Significance, 7 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 
403 (2005). The research assistance of Scott Borrowman, Joseph Wright, Kevin Fiet, and Zachary 
Starr and the production assistance of Marcene Mason are gratefully acknowledged. 
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F. Other Federalism Objections by Opponents of an FMPA and 
a Brief Reply (They Miss the Point) 
 
IV. HOW TO ESTABLISH CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION FOR MARRIAGE 
A. Congressional Proposal of Constitutional Amendments 
B. State Legislature Applications for a Constitutional  
Convention 
C. Judicial Invention of Constitutional Protection by Interpre-
tation 
D. Lessons from Loving 
 
V. CONCLUSION: PURSING A THREE-PRONGED APPROACH TO PROTECT  
        MARRIAGE 
 
* * * * * 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
As a result of judicial decisions by American courts mandating the 
legalization of same-sex marriage or giving marriage-equivalent status 
and benefits to same-sex unions during the past decade, several amend-
ments to the Constitution of the United States have been proposed for the 
purpose of protecting the institution of marriage and barring same-sex 
marriage. These amendments include a variety of substantive, structural, 
and hybrid substantive-and-structural proposals. Collectively, the pro-
posed amendments are called Federal Marriage Protection Amendments 
(or “FMPAs”) herein. 
These proposals have been controversial for both substantive and 
structural reasons. Some opponents (including advocates of same-sex un-
ions) object on substantive grounds that marriage should not be cast in 
constitutional cement, but should remain open to growth, evolution and 
expansion, reflecting the changing circumstances of our society. Others 
object on federalism grounds, arguing that the definition and regulation 
of marriage, including policy decisions whether same-sex unions should 
be given marital or marriage-like domestic relationship status, benefits 
and rights, are matters that have been, and should continue to be, left to 
the discretion of individual states. 
This paper addresses two basic questions about proposed FMPAs. 
First, why are the FMPAs being proposed—specifically, what is the 
need, and why should they be supported? Second, how may FMPA ad-
vocates achieve the objective of securing constitutional protection for the 
institution of marriage? 
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In Part II this paper reviews the recent history of proposed constitu-
tional amendments defining marriage including textual developments 
and the latest proposed variations. Part III addresses the “why” question, 
noting the reasons advocates of FMPAs give for why a constitutional 
amendment defining and protecting marriage is necessary. Some of the 
“why not” arguments and brief responses to the same are also included. 
Part IV addresses the “how” question, and discusses the ways and means 
available to achieve the objective of providing constitutional protection 
for the institution of conjugal marriage. Part V contains a brief conclu-
sion. 
At the outset, I should disclose my own background on this issue. As 
a family law professor for more than twenty-five years, it is my opinion 
that giving same-sex unions either marital or quasi-marital legal status 
and benefits would have profoundly detrimental effects not only upon the 
institution of marriage, but also families, children, and society. Accord-
ingly, I have testified before legislators in several states in favor of pro-
posals that would prohibit recognition of same-sex marriage.1 I have 
given similar testimony before both houses of the United States Con-
gress.2 However, I also firmly believe in the value of federalism in fam-
ily law. Indeed, in the summer of 2003, I presented a lengthy scholarly 
paper at a family law professors’ conference at the University of Oregon 
School of Law in which I explained why I did not support the proposed 
Federal Marriage Amendment, and expressed my criticisms of it based 
on concerns about preserving federalism in family law.3 However, since 
1. See, e.g., Oral testimony and written statement presented to Judiciary Committee, Hawaii 
House of Representatives, Honolulu, Hawaii, (Jan. 21, 1997) (regarding H.B. 117 overturning the 
ruling in Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (that Hawaii Constitution equal protection provi-
sions facially violated by denial of same-sex marriage) (copy in author’s possession)); Written state-
ment of Professor Lynn D. Wardle in support of S.J.R. No. 42 and S.C.R. No. 25, submitted for 
Alaska Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on Monday (Mar. 9, 1998) (copy in author’s posses-
sion); Oral testimony (written statement provided in 1997) presented to the Judiciary Committee, 
California State Senate, regarding S.B. 911 (prohibiting recognition of same-sex marriages) (copy in 
author’s possession); Written statements to state legislative Judiciary Committees in Nebraska and 
Ohio regarding same-sex marriage (Feb.-Mar. 1997); Testimony about recognition of Same-sex 
Marriage (S.B. 45) before the State and Veterans Affairs Committee of the Colorado Senate (Feb. 9, 
2000) (copy in author’s possession); Testimony regarding adoptions by non-marital cohabitants 
(S.B. 63) before the Judiciary Committee of the Utah Senate, (Feb. 16, 2000) (copy in author’s pos-
session); Testimony about adoptions by non-marital cohabitants (H.B. 103) before the Judiciary 
Committee of the Utah House of Representatives (Feb. 24, 2000) (copy in author’s possession). 
2. See, e.g., Statement and prepared statement in The Defense of Marriage Act, Hearing Be-
fore the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representa-
tives, 104 Cong., 2d Sess., on H.R. 3396, May 15, 1996 (Serial No. 69) at 158-80; Defense of Mar-
riage Act, Hearing on S. 1740 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 2d Sess., 23-
42 (July 11, 1996); Are Federal and State Marriage Protection Laws Vulnerable to Judicial Activ-
ism?: Hearing before the Senate Subcomm on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Property Rights 
(Apr. 13, 2005), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1454&wit_id=4136 (seen 
Apr. 11, 06) (copy in author’s possession). 
3. Lynn D. Wardle, Federalism in Family Law and the Proposed Federal Marriage 
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then, judicial rulings of a number of federal and state courts have in-
voked various constitutional doctrines to mandate the legalization of 
same-sex unions and to invalidate laws designed to protect the institution 
of conjugal marriage. Thus, I have become convinced that, for better or 
worse, the issue of same-sex marriage is being decided, and before long, 
will be completely decided as a matter of federal constitutional law by 
judicial decisions. The question is no longer whether the same-sex mar-
riage issue will be federalized—that already is happening. Rather, the 
question is how the institution of marriage can be constitutionally pro-
tected while preserving as much as possible of the core constitutional 
principle of federalism in family law. I believe that a clear, textual fed-
eral constitutional amendment is the best way to simultaneously protect 
marriage and to preserve federalism in family law. Thus, I have recently 
presented two papers in which I expressed my strong support for a fed-
eral marriage protection amendment.4
 
II.  RECENT DEVELOPMENTS REGARDING A FEDERAL MARRIAGE 
PROTECTION AMENDMENT 
 
The first version of a proposed Federal Marriage Protection Amend-
ment was introduced in the House of Representatives on May 15, 2002, 
as H.J. Res. 93,5 by Representative Shows and five co-sponsors in the 
second session of the 107th Congress.6 It provided: 
 
Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man 
and a woman. Neither this Constitution or the constitution of any State, 
nor state or federal law, shall be construed to require that marital status 
or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon unmarried couples or 
groups.7
 
Amendment, Address at the International Society of Family Law North American Regional Confer-
ence at the University of Oregon School of Law in Eugene, Oregon (June 27, 2003) (copy in au-
thor’s possession). 
4. See Lynn D. Wardle, The Proposed Federal Marriage Amendment and the Risks to Fed-
eralism in Family Law, 2 UNIV. ST. THOMAS L. REV. 137 (2005) [hereinafter “Wardle, The Pro-
posed FMA”]; Lynn D. Wardle, Tyranny, Federalism, and the Federal Marriage Amendment, 17 
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 221 (2005) [hereinafter “Wardle, Tyranny”]. While some proposals are bet-
ter than others, I could support many of the federal marriage amendments that have been proposed. I 
have discussed some pros and cons of various wording in Wardle, The Proposed FMA. 
5. H.J.Res. 93, 107th Cong., (2d Sess. 2002). It was introduced by Mr. Shows for six spon-
sors. For a full history of the early proposed Federal Marriage Amendments, see Wardle, The Pro-
posed FMA, supra note 5, at 137-47. 
6. See Stanley Kurtz, Marriage News, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE (May 15, 2002), 
available at http://www.nationalreview.com/thecorner/2002_05_12_corner-archive.asp. See gener-
ally Wardle, The Proposed FMA, supra note 5, at 142-73 (detailed history). 
7. H.J.Res. 93, 107th Cong. (2002). 
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The same text was reintroduced the following year (after the No-
vember 2002 elections) in the first session of the 108th Congress on May 
21, 2003, by Rep. Marilyn Musgrave and five co-sponsors as H.J. Res. 
56.8 After the June 2003 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Lawrence 
v. Texas,9 holding that laws prohibiting sodomy are irrational and uncon-
stitutional,10 and the October 2003 decision of the Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court in Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health,11 declaring 
the Massachusetts marriage law irrational and unconstitutional and man-
dating same-sex marriage,12 more than one hundred twenty-five addi-
tional congressmen signed on as co-sponsors of H.J. Res. 56.13 Similarly, 
after those judicial decisions, Senator Allard introduced a Senate version 
of the Federal Marriage Amendment, S.J. Res. 26, with identical text, on 
November 25, 2003.14
The following year, in the second session of the 108th Congress, 
Senator Allard with eight other co-sponsors introduced an alternative 
version of the FMPA, S.J. Res. 30, on March 22, 2004.15
On May 13, 2004, the House of Representatives Subcommittee on 
the Constitution of the Judiciary Committee held hearings on H.J. Res. 
56.16 The United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommit-
tee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Property Rights held a one-day 
hearing on March 3, 2004, on the subject “Judicial Activism vs. Democ-
racy: What Are the National Implications of the Massachusetts Good-
ridge Decision and the Judicial Invalidation of Traditional Marriage 
Laws?”17 Earlier, on September 4, 2003, before S.J. Res. 30 was intro-
duced in the Senate, the same subcommittee held hearings entitled “What 
8. H.J.Res. 56, 108th Cong. (2002). 
9. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
10. Id. at 578-79. 
11. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
12. Id. at 948. 
13. As of October 9, 2004, there were 131 House member co-sponsors for H.J.Res. 56. See 
Library of Congress, Bill Summary for 108th Congress, H.J.Res. 56. 
14. S.J. Res. 26, 108thCong. (Nov. 25, 2003). As of September 22, 2004, it had 10 co-
sponsors. See Library of Congress, Bill Summary and Status for 108th Congress, S.J.Res. 26, at 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:SJ00026:|/bss/d108query.html| (last visited Sept. 22, 
2004) or http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/printers/108th/93656.PDF (last visited Apr. 12, 
2006). 
15.  S.J. Res. 30, 108th Cong. at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c108:S.J.RES.30: (last 
visited Sept. 27, 2004). 
16.  The Federal Marriage Amendment (The Musgrave Amendment), Hearing Before the 
Subcommittee on the Constitution of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004). 
17.  Judicial Activism vs. Democracy: What are the National Implications of the Massa-
chuseet Goodridge Decision and the Judicial Invalidation of Traditional Marriage Laws?, Hearing 
Before the Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Property Rights, 108th Cong. (2004) 
at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=1072 (last visited Sept. 22, 2004). 
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is Needed to Defend the Bipartisan Defense of Marriage Act of 1996?”18 
Three weeks later, on March 23, 2004, the full Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee held hearings on S.J. Res. 26,19 and three months later, on June 22, 
2004, the whole Senate Judiciary Committee held yet another related 
hearing titled “Preserving Traditional Marriage: A View from the 
States.”20
After these hearings, Senator Allard reintroduced a slightly modified 
version of his bill as S.J. Res. 40, on July 7, 2004, with a total of 19 co-
sponsors. This new version of the FMPA provided: 
 
Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man 
and a woman. Neither this Constitution, nor the constitution of any 
State, shall be construed to require that marriage or the legal incidents 
thereof be conferred upon any union other than the union of a man and 
a woman.21
 
Just one week after being introduced S.J. Res. 40 was presented for a 
record vote in the full Senate on a motion to invoke cloture (to end de-
bate—a threatened filibuster).22 The Senate vote was 48 - 50 - 2 (Sena-
tors Kerry and Edwards did not vote).23
The House also proceeded to consider a proposed FMPA. On Sep-
tember 23, 2004, Rep. Musgrave introduced H.J.Res. 106,24 a revised 
18.  Hearing Before the Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Property Rights 
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) at http://judiciary.senate.gov/ 
testimony.cfm?id=906&wit_id=2539 (last visited Sept. 22, 2004). 
19.  A Proposed Constitutional Amendment to Preserve Traditional Marriage: Hearing Be-
fore the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004), at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing. 
cfm ?id=1118 (last visited Sept. 22, 2004). 
20.  Preserving Traditional Marriage: A View from the States: Hearing Before the Senate 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004), at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=1234, 
(last visited September 22, 2004). Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney and former Representative 
Bob Barr were the primary witnesses. 
21.  S.J. Res. 40, 108th Cong. (2004) at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/query/z?c108: 
S.J.RES.40:, (last visited Sept. 27, 2004). My thanks to Andrew Koppelman for sharing the identifi-
cation of this Resolution. 
22.  Record Vote No. 155, U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes, 108th Cong. (July 14, 2004), at 
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=108&session
=2&vote=00155 (last visited Sept. 27, 2004). 
23.  Id.; see also 150th CONG. REC. S8061-03 (July 14, 2004), available at 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/R?r108:FLD001:S58091 (last visited Sept. 27, 2004). 
24.  It states, “Marriage in the United States shall consist solely of the union of a man and a 
woman. Neither this Constitution, nor the constitution of any State, shall be construed to require that 
marriage or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon any union other than the union of a man 
and a woman.” H.J.Res. 106, 108th Cong. (2004), at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c108:H.J. 
RES.106: (last visited Oct. 9, 2004). The bill had 121 co-sponsors within five days. See Library of 
Congress, Bill Summary and Status for the 108th Congress, H.J. Res. 106, at 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/D?d108:1:./temp/~bdRycD:@@@N|/bss/d108query.html| 
(last visited Oct. 9, 2004). 
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version of the FMPA, with language almost identical to S.J. Res. 40.25 
On September 30, 2004, the House voted on H.J.Res.106, with 227 
members supporting the proposed amendment and 186 opposing it.26 Al-
though this vote represented a strong majority it was far short of the re-
quired 2/3 vote for passage of a proposed constitutional amendment.27
Following these votes, the 2004 federal elections brought relatively 
few changes to Congress. Yet, congressional interest in a federal mar-
riage amendment seems to wane in non-congressional-election years. 
On January 24, 2005, shortly after the first session of the 109th Con-
gress convened, S.J. Res.1 was introduced by Senator Allard and initially 
co-sponsored by twenty-four (now twenty-eight) other Senators.28 Styled 
the “Marriage Protection Amendment,” it provides: 
 
Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man 
and a woman. Neither this Constitution, nor the constitution of any 
State, shall be construed to require that marriage or the legal incidents 
thereof be conferred upon any union other than the union of a man and 
a woman.29
 
In the House of Representatives, a significantly different proposal, 
H.J. Res. 39, was introduced on March 17, 2005, by Representative 
Daniel Lungren on behalf of ten congressmen.30 It provides: 
 
SECTION 1. Marriage in the United States shall consist only of a legal 
union of one man and one woman. 
 
SECTION 2. No court of the United States or of any State shall have 
jurisdiction to determine whether this Constitution or the constitution 
of any State requires that the legal incidents of marriage be conferred 
upon any union other than a legal union between one man and one 
woman. 
 
SECTION 3. No State shall be required to give effect to any public act, 
record, or judicial proceeding of any other State concerning a union be-
25.  H.J. Res. 106 uses the word “solely,” while S.J.Res. 40 uses the word “only” to describe 
the legal exclusivity of the institution of conjugal marriage. 
26.  Library of Congress, Summary of Bills Introduced in the 108th Congress, H.J. Res. 106, 
at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/D?d108:4:./temp/~bdBT8h:: (last visited Oct. 9, 2004). 
27.  Id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. V. 
28.  Sen. J. Res. 1, 109th Cong. (2005), at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi- bin/bdquery/z?d109 
:SJ00001:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Sept. 5, 2005). 
29.  Id. 
30.  H.R. J. Res. 39, 109th Cong. (2005), at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109: 
HJ00039:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Sept. 5, 2005). 
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tween persons of the same-sex that is treated as a marriage, or as hav-
ing the legal incidents of marriage, under the laws of such other State.31
 
Both proposals were referred to each house’s respective Judiciary 
Committee; S.J. Res. 1 was approved by a Subcommittee and is expected 
to be voted upon in Spring 2006.32
On April 14, 2005, Senator Sam Brownback proposed an alternative 
federal marriage amendment. It reads: 
 
Section 1: Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union 
of a man and a woman. 
Section 2: Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by ap-
propriate legislation.33
 
The Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Property 
Rights, chaired by Senator Brownback, as well as the full U.S. Senate 
Judiciary Committee have since held hearings about the need for and 
considerations regarding a proposed federal marriage amendment.34
Thus, every year for the past four years, in three consecutive con-
gresses, at least one or more version of a proposed federal constitutional 
amendment to protect the institution of conjugal marriage has been intro-
duced. The initial votes on the proposed amendments came only two 
years after the first proposed amendment was introduced; while they fell 
far short of the two-thirds approval required in either house in 2004, they 
won a significant majority vote in the House and received a near-
majority in the Senate, and are expected to draw more votes in 2006. 
President Bush declared his support for a federal marriage amendment in 
his 2004 State of the Union address.35
31.  Id. 
32.  Id.; see also supra note 27. S.J. Res. 1, Latest Major Action (11/9/2005 subcomittee ap-
proved), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:SJ00001:@@@X (seen May 1, 
2006); see also James Downing, Marriage amendment picks up four votes over ‘04, The Hill (April 
12, 2006) available at http://www.hillnews.com/thehill/export/TheHill/News/Campaign/041206.html 
(seen May 1, 2006) (“A majority of the Senate this year will support the Federal Marriage Amend-
ment . . . .”). 
33.  See S.J. Res. 13, 109th Cong. (2005) (introduced by Sen. Brownback on Apr. 14, 2005); 
Information and Materials, Federalism and the Law of Marriage Conference, Aug. 26-27, 2005, at 
Harvard Law School, at Tab. 16 (copy in author’s possession). 
34.  Are Federal and State Marriage Protection Laws Vulnerable to Judicial Activism: Hear-
ing Before the Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Property Rights of the Senate 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005); An Examination of the Constitution Amendment on 
Marriage, Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. 109th Cong. (2005) at 
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=1641 (last visited Oct. 18, 2005) (hearing scheduled for 
Oct. 20, 2005). 
35.  President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 20, 2004), at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040120-7.html (last visited October 6, 2004). 
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Additionally, other Senators have discussed (without formally intro-
ducing) other variations of a federal marriage protection amendment. 
Senator Hatch has suggested: 
 
Civil marriage shall be defined in each state by the legislature or the 
citizens thereof. Nothing in the Constitution shall be construed to re-
quire that marriage or its benefits be extended to any union other than 
that of a man and a woman.36
 
Various academics also have proposed alternative language for a 
Federal Marriage Protection Amendment. For example, Professors Nel-
son Lund and John O. McGinnis have proposed: 
 
Sec[tion] 1. Nothing in this Constitution shall be construed to require 
any institution of government in the United States to recognize as mar-
riage, or grant any benefits or incidents of marriage to, any union ex-
cept that of one man and one woman. 
Sec[tion] 2. No state shall be required by any federal law, or by any 
provisions of this Constitution, to recognize the validity of any mar-
riage except a marriage of one man and one woman.37
 
Thus, it is clear that there is a strong movement to amend the Consti-
tution of the United States to protect the institution of conjugal marriage. 
It appears that the movement for a Federal Marriage Protection Amend-
ment is still alive and well, but makes significant progress only in federal 
election years; it was perceived by the Republicans in 2004 to be an issue 
that would help them win elections. Thus, one may expect Congress in 





36.  See NR Editors, A Battle, Joined, Marriage and the Constitution, NATIONAL REVIEW 
ONLINE, http://www.nationalreview.com/nr_comment/editors200403040830.asp (last visited Octo-
ber 17, 2005); see also Information and Materials, Federalism and the Law of Marriage Conference, 
Aug. 26-27, 2005, at Harvard Law School, at Tab. 16 (copy in author’s possession). Ultimately, 
Senator Hatch supported the proposed FMA. See Sen. Orrin Hatch, Floor Statement: “Federal Mar-
riage Amendment” (July 12, 2004), at http://hatch.senate.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressReleases. 
View&PressRelease_id=1101 (last visited Oct. 17, 2005). 
37.  Nelson Lund & John O. McGinnis, Colloquium, The Boundaries of Liberty After Law-
rence v. Texas: Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial Hubris, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1613, n.210 
(2004) (Section Three of the proposal is omitted.); see also Scott Dodson, Constitutional Thematics 
and the Peculiar Federal Marriage Amendment, 20 BYU J. PUB. L. 233 (2006 in press) (possible 
improved FMPA language suggested). 
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III.  WHY A FEDERAL MARRIAGE PROTECTION AMENDMENT 
SHOULD BE ADOPTED 
 
There are many reasons why it is reasonable—indeed, critical—that 
an amendment to the Constitution of the United States protecting the in-
stitution of marriage by defining marriage as the union of a man and a 
woman be adopted. First, constitutions are intended to reflect the core 
values and protect the cherished institutions and relationships of the peo-
ple, especially those that the people perceive to be threatened. “Constitu-
tions reflect society’s fundamental beliefs and cherished values.”38 There 
is strong evidence that the American people highly value the institution 
of conjugal marriage and believe that it is in jeopardy.39 Second, there 
has been a growing pattern of judicial attempts to radically redefine mar-
riage to include same-sex couples.40 Third, the constitutions of most of 
the nations of the world (most of which have been adopted in the past 
sixty years and reflect modern social conditions and dangers) expressly 
provide protection for family and marriage relations in the text of their 
constitutions.41 Fourth, many important international conventions, com-
pacts, and human rights declarations provide explicit protection for fam-
ily and marriage relations.42 Fifth, a narrow and precise Federal Marriage 
Protection Amendment will re-establish the principle of federalism in 
family law, and effect a much more modest alteration of traditional fed-
eralism than the trend of recent judicial decisions redefining marriage to 
include same-sex unions.43
 
A.  The American People Highly Value the Institution of Conjugal Mar-
riage, Believe That It Is In Jeopardy, and Want to Adopt Constitutional 
Protections for Marriage 
 
38.  William C. Koch, Jr., Reopening Tennessee’s Open Courts Clause: A Historical Recon-
sideration of Article I, Section 17 of the Tennessee Constitution, 27 U. MEM. L. REV. 333, 448 
(1997); see also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 62 (Black, J., concurring) (“[T]he Bill of Rights safe-
guards . . . are the very vitals of a sound constitutional legal system designed to protect and safe-
guard the most cherished liberties of a free people.”); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Our Structural Consti-
tution, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1687, 1687 (2004) (“Americans properly revere our Constitution for its 
protection of individual rights.”); Samuel D. Brooks, Note, Native American Indians’ Fruitless 
Search for First Amendment Protection of The Sacred Religious Sites, 24 VALPO. U. L. REV. 521, 
530 (1990) (“The framers of the Bill of Rights intended the first amendment to protect against the 
type of government oppression of the individual that motivated their escape to the ‘New World.’”).  
39.  See infra Part III.A. 
40.  See infra Part III.B.; see also Wardle, The Proposed FMA, supra note 5, at 185-94; 
Wardle, Tyranny, supra note 5, at 255-61. 
41.  See infra Part III.C. 
42.  See infra Part III.D. 
43.  See infra Part III.E; see also Wardle, Tyranny, supra note 5, at 262-63. 
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Constitutional provisions and amendments historically have been 
adopted to protect basic rights and institutions that are perceived to be 
threatened.44 Thus, for example, in 1787 there was bona fide concern 
about the national government granting “Title[s] of Nobility”45 and about 
the State governments granting “Letters of Marque and Reprisal,”46 so 
the delegates to the Federal Convention in Philadelphia included specific 
provisions in the Constitution to prevent those possible abuses.47 Like-
wise, in 1789, the right of the people to be secure in their homes from be-
ing forced to quarter government troops was perceived to be in jeopardy, 
so James Madison and the other drafters of the Constitution and the Bill 
of Rights proposed, and the legislatures of 3/4 of the states ratified, a 
specific amendment to the Constitution protecting that facet of family 
life from government intrusion.48 Further, in 1865, it was widely believed 
that unless slavery was constitutionally abolished, some states would re-
vive a form of the practice of slavery (at the time considered to be a 
“domestic relationship” and regulated by the states as such), so slavery 
was constitutionally outlawed by the Thirteenth Amendment.49 Today, 
titles of nobility, letters of marque and reprisal, forced quartering of 
troops, and slavery are no longer considered to be imminent threats, and 
it is likely that if the Constitution were to be rewritten today, some of 
those provisions might not be included. 
Today, the majority of American people believe that marriage is se-
riously threatened by the movement (including judicial decisions) seek-
ing to legalize same-sex marriage and that constitutional protection for 
marriage is needed. Voters in nineteen states have passed state marriage 
44.  See generally Lynn D. Wardle, State Marriage Amendments: Developments, Precedents 
and Significance, 7 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 403 (2005) (hereinafter “Wardle, SMAs”). 
45.  U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 8. 
46.  U.S. CONST., art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
47.  See The Federalist No. 44, at 281-84 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(Madison writing of need for “additional fences against these dangers” to prevent abuses such as 
prohibition on granting letters of marque and reprisal, passing ex post facto laws, bills of attainder, 
granting titles of nobility, etc.); id. No. 84, at 511 (Alexander Hamilton) (Hamilton noting that pro-
hibition of granting titles of nobility, etc., “are perhaps greater securities to liberty and republicanism 
than any” other provisions in the Constitution). See generally James Madison, Notes of Debates in 
the Federal Convention of 1787 at 451-52, 587-89, 651 (1966) (concerns about aristocracy); id. at 
579, 641 (concern about states granting letters of marque and reprisal).   
48.  U.S. CONST., amend. III. 
49.  See generally Alexander Tsesis, The Thirteenth Amendment and American Freedom: A 
Legal History (2004); Michael Vorenberg, Final Freedom: The Civil War, The Abolition of Slavery 
and the Thirteenth Amendment (2001); Alexander Tsesis, Furthering American Freedom: Civil 
Rights and the Thirteenth Amendment 45 B.C. L. REV. 307 (2004) (history of the Thirteenth 
Amendment); Robert J. Kaczorowski, To Begin the Nation Anew: Congress, Citizenship, and Civil 
Rights After the Civil War, 92 AM. HIST. REV. 45, 47-48 (1987); Jacobus Broek, Thirteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States: Consummation to Abolition and Key to the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 39 CAL. L. REV. 171, 174-75 (1951). 
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amendments (“SMAs”)50 and nationally the average vote in favor of such 
amendments has been 70%.51 In 2004 alone, voters in thirteen states rati-
fied SMAs by overwhelming margins (from a low of 57% to a high of 
87% popular voter support),52 and in 2005, voters in Kansas and Texas 
overwhelmingly approved SMAs.53 State marriage amendments have 
been approved by legislatures to be on the ballots in six additional states 
in2006, and in two other states proposed state marriage amendments are 
currently in mid-process (involved in multi-year amendment proposal-
and-ratification processes).54 Moreover, twenty-six other states that have 
not yet adopted a state marriage amendment have enacted statutory pro-
tection for conjugal marriage.55 Recent public opinion polls likewise re-
port that approximately 60% of Americans express support for an 
amendment to the U.S. Constitution defining marriage as an institution 
for male-female unions only.56 In fact, between June 2003 and May 
50.  Joshua K. Baker, Status, Substance, and Structure: An Interpretative Framework for Un-
derstanding the State Marriage Amendments, 17 REGENT U. L. REV.221, App. I (2004-2005); 
National Conference of State Legislatures, at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/cyf/samesex.htm#DOMA 
(last visited Sept. 1, 2005). In 2005, Kansas and Texas adopted state marriage amendments, bringing 
the total to nineteen states with marriage amendments. See National Conference of State Legisla-
tures, Same Sex Marriage (Jan. 2006), available at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/cyf/same 
sex.htm#DOMA (last visited March 28, 2006). 
51.  National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, Voting Tallies: State Anti-gay Ballot Initiatives, at 
http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/StateBallotPollingData2004.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2005). 
52.  CNN.Com, Election Results at http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/pages/results/ bal-
lot.measures/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2005); see also Baker, supra note 51, at App. I (noting voters in 
13 states approved marriage amendments in 2004). 
53.  Kansas Const., Art. 15, § 16 (2005); Texas Consti., Art. I, sec. 32 (2005); see also Emily 
J. Sack, Civil Unions and the Meaning of the Public Policy Exception at the Boundaries of Domestic 
Relations Law, 3 AVE MARIA L. REV. 497, 503 n.24 (2005).
54.  See generally Cheryl Wetzstein, Gay ‘marriage’ battles rage on into their year, Wash. 
Times, Dec, 26, 2005, available at http://www.washingtontimes .com/national/20051225-114001-
1901r.htm (last seen January 1, 2006). The states with marriage amendments on the ballot in 2006 
include Alabama, Idaho, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Virginia. See also Senate 
Republican Policy Committee, State-by-state Marriage Protection Update (Mar. 31, 2005) (copy in 
author’s possession). 
55.  Id. Only six or seven states (depending on how Wisconsin is categorized) lack any consti-
tutional or statutory protection for conjugal marriage. Id.; Same Sex Marriage, National Conference 
of State Legislatures (Jan. 2006) at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/cyf/samesex.htm#DOMA. 
56.  Jennifer Harper, More Americans Oppose Gay Marriage, Poll Finds, WASH. TIMES, 
Apr. 2, 2005, at http://washingtontimes.com/national/20050401-114205-2153r.htm (last visited Oct. 
18, 2005) (CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll found 68% of Americans oppose same-sex marriage, and 
57% favor and only 37% oppose a constitution amendment defining marriage as the union of a man 
and a woman); CBS News, Polls: Few Favor Same-sex Marriage, Mar. 15, 2004, at http://www.cbs 
news.com/stories/2004/03/15/opinion/polls/main606453.shtml (last visited Oct. 18, 2005) (59% fa-
vor a constitutional marriage amendment to allow only man-woman marriage, up from 55% three 
months earlier; only 35% oppose, down from 40% earlier); Alliance for Marriage, National Wirthlin 
Poll Finds Most Americans Support a Constitutional Amendment to Defend Marriage, at 
http://www.allianceformarriage.org/site/PageServer?pagename=mac_30304 (last visited Oct, 18, 
2005) (Wirthlin poll released March 3, 2003, by Alliance for Marriage shows 57% of total popula-
tion sampled, 62% of African-Americans sampled, and 63% of Hispanics sampled favor a federal 
marriage amendment; 62% of total population agreed marriage is the union of a man and a woman); 
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2005, Gallup polls recorded an increase in opposition to same-sex mar-
riage from 55% to 68%, and an increase in support for a constitutional 
amendment from 50% to 57%.57 Clearly, a socio-legal-political phe-
nomenon of some significance is occurring in the United States of Amer-
ica. There is no denying that a majority of American people strongly 
support enacting constitutional protection for conjugal marriage—
defining marriage as the union of a man and a woman. 
 
B.  Recent Court Decisions Have Attempted to Redefine Marriage or 
Mandate Marriage-like Legal Status of Same-sex Couples 
 
Public perception that marriage is in serious danger of radical redefi-
nition by the judiciary is well grounded. Courts in eight states already 
 
Rev. Dick Richardson, Mom-and-Pop Voter Force, WASH. TIMES, at http://www.washtimes.com 
/commentary/20040807-103947-8383r.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2005) (“A recent Wirthlin poll 
found 56 percent of self-identified Democrats support the Federal Marriage Amendment, affirming 
marriage as the union of a man and a woman.”). However, a Boston Globe (Massachusetts) poll pub-
lished May 9, 2005, reported that the liberal newspaper found 45% supported a federal marriage 
amendment, while 47% opposed it. See ReligiousTolerance.org, Single U.S. Public Opinion Polls: 
Same-sex Marriage and Civil Unions, at http://www.religioustolerance.org/hom_marp.htm (Last 
visited Oct. 17, 2005). Likewise, The National Gay and Lesbian Task Force reports that a March 20, 
2004 Gallup poll showed only 45% favored a constitutional amendment (the same percentage as 
nearly a year earlier) while 50% opposed (also the same percentage as nearly a year earlier). Recent 
National Polls on Same-sex Marriage and Civil Unions, (Mar. 20, 2004) at 
http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/RecentNationalMarch2004.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2005). 
On the other end of the political spectrum a March 4, 1004 poll reported by Focus on the Family 
reported that 94% of respondents opposed same-sex marriage and only 6% supported it. These poll 
results probably were colored by the position espoused by the organization that undertook the sur-
veys in each case. The Barna Group reported in June 2004 that its surveys showed the public 
strongly divided, with 46% in favor of the proposed (early draft) federal marriage amendment, (in-
cluding 35% strongly in favor), and 44% opposed (including 31% strongly opposed). The Barna 
Group, Public Divided on Marriage Amendment (June 21, 2004) at http://www.barna.org/FlexPage 
.aspx?Page=BarnaUpdateNarrow&BarnaUpdateID=166 (last visited Oct. 18, 2005). In January 
2004, an ABC News/Washington Post opinion survey found that most Americans oppose both same-
sex marriage and a constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage; 55% opposed same-sex 
marriage, 51% opposed civil unions, and only 38% favored a federal constitutional amendment, 
while 58% favored leaving the issue to the states. David Morris & Gary Langer, Same-sex Marriage, 
Most oppose it, but balk at amending the Constitution, at http://abcnews.go.com/sections 
/us/Relationships/same_sex_marriage_poll_040121.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2005). The Field Poll 
showed that in June 2004 Californians opposed same-sex marriage (53% to 43%) but also opposed a 
federal marriage amendment (54% to 41%). The Field Poll, Release #2118, at 
http://field.com/fieldpollonline/subscribers/RLS2118.pdf (June 4, 2004) (last visited Oct. 18, 2005). 
Clearly, poll wording, timing and location also may influence the results. Michael Foust, What 
gives? Polls Show Differing Results on Marriage Amendment Support, BP NEWS, Feb. 6, 2004, at 
http://www.bpnews.net/bpnews.asp?ID=17591 (last visited Oct. 18, 2005) (CBS/NY Times poll in 
December 2003 showed 55% of Americans favored a federal marriage amendment, while an Annen-
berg poll the same month found that 52% opposed a federal marriage amendment; difference ex-
plained by wording of the questions asked). 
57.  Joshua K. Baker, Same-Sex Marriage: Recent Trends in Public Opinion, IMAPP Policy 
Brief, at http://www.marriagedebate.com/pdf/iMAPP.2005opinionupdate.pdf (Last visited Oct. 18, 
2005). 
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have ruled in favor of same-sex marriage (though some cases have been 
overturned or are not final).58 Cases are currently pending in another 
eight states challenging marriage laws disallowing same-sex marriage.59 
While the court of last resort in only one state has forced legalization of 
same-sex marriage thus far,60 the effort is underway in many state courts 
to achieve the compulsory legalization of same-sex marriage by judicial 
fiat. 
Similarly, court decisions in New York and Iowa have recently 
called into question the constitutionality of state and federal “Defense of 
Marriage Acts” (DOMAs) which legislatively defend the definition of 
marriage.61 In decisions that have serious implications for the federal 
DOMA, two state courts in Washington have ruled that a state DOMA is 
unconstitutional under state constitutional doctrines.62 Even more omi-
nously, in early 2005, a federal district court in Nebraska ruled that the 
state’s DOMA violated the First Amendment (freedom of intimate asso-
ciation), the Equal Protection Clause, and the constitutional prohibition 
against Bills of Attainder in the U.S. Constitution!63
59. 
58.  These decisions have come in Hawaii, Alaska, Vermont, Massachusetts, Oregon, 
Washington, New York, and California. Only the Vermont and Massachusetts decisions are final. 
See Wardle, Tyranny, supra note 5, at 2
59.  See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993); Baehr v. Miicke, 196 WL 694235 
(Haw. Cir. Ct. 1996) (overturned by state constitutional amendment); Brause v. Bureau of Vital Sta-
tistics, No. 3AN-95-6562, 1998 WL 88743 at 6 (Alaska. Super. Ct., Feb. 27, 1998) (overturned by 
state constitutional amendment); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999); Goodridge v. Department 
of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 943, 959 (Mass. 2003); In re Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 
802 N.E.2d 565, 569-71 (Mass. 2004); Li v. State, 2004 WL 1258167 (Or. Cir. April 20, 2004), 
rev’d, 110 P.3d 91 (Ore. 2005) (because of state constitutional amendment); Andersen v. King 
County, 2004 WL 1738447 *3,4,11 (Wash. Super. 2004); Castle v. State, 2004 WL 1985215, *11 
(Wash.Super. Sep 07, 2004) (both pending on appeal); Hernandez v. Robles, 794 N.Y.S.2d 579 
(N.Y.Sup., Feb. 4, 2005) rev’d, Hernandez v. Robles, 26 A.D.3d 98, 805 N.Y.S.2d 354 (N.Y.App. 
Div., 2005); see also Samuels v. New York State Dept. Of Health, 811 N.Y.S.2d 136, (N.Y.App. 
Div.,2006); In re Coordination Proceeding, Special Title [Rule 1550(c)] Marriage Cases, No. 4365, 
2005 WL 583129 (Cal. Super. Crt. San. Fran., Mar. 14, 2005). 
60.  Goodridge, supra note 60; Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, supra note 60 (civil un-
ion or any other kind of domestic union other than full, same-sex marriage violates the Massachu-
setts Constitution). 
61.  See, e.g., Langan v. St. Vincent’s Hospital of N.Y., 192 N.Y. Misc. 2d 442, 445 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2003) (“It is unclear by what authority the Congress may suspend or limit the full faith 
and credit clause of the Constitution, and the constitutionality of DOMA has been put in doubt.”); 
Alons v. Iowa Dist. Court, 698 N.W.2d 858 (Iowa 2005); see also Alons v. Iowa District Court for 
Woodbury County, Lambda Legal, at http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/cases/record?record 
=203 (last visited Mar. 19, 2005); Iowa Supreme Court to Hear Oral Argument Friday in Lesbian 
Civil Union Dissolution Case, Jan. 11, 2005, at http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/news/ 
press. html?record=1605 (last visited Apr. 12, 2006). 
62.  See Andersen v. King County, No. 04-2-04964-4-SEA, 2004 WL 1738447 at *3, *4, *11 
(Wash. Super. Aug. 4, 2004) (invalidating state DOMA); Castle v. State, No. 04-2-00614-4, 2004 
WL 1985215 at *3, *4, *10-*13, *16 (Wash. Super. Sept. 7, 2004) (invalidating state DOMA). 
63.  Citizens for Equal Protection, Inc. v. Bruning, 368 F.Supp.2d 980 (D. Neb. 2005) (per-
manent injunction of state marriage amendment in part because it is a Bill of Attainder); see also 
Citizens for Equal Protection, Inc. v. Bruning , 290 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1008-11 (D. Neb. 2003) (find-
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Thus, public perception that marriage is in danger of being radically 
redefined by judicial decree is not speculative or fantastic. It is based on 
a deliberate litigation campaign that has resulted in a growing pattern of 
serious judicial developments. 
 
C.  Explicit Protection for Marriage and Family in National 
Constitutions is the Global Norm 
 
The constitutions of the majority of nations of the world (most of 
which have been adopted in the past sixty years and reflect modern social 
conditions and dangers) contain express, explicit protection for family 
and marriage relations in the text of their constitutions; many of them 
expressly define marriage as the union of man and woman. Indeed, of the 
191 sovereign nations the United Nations recognizes,64 at least 137 of 
them have national constitutions that contain substantive language pro-
tecting or structural provisions allocating power to protect families 
and/or family relations.65 That is 71% of the 191 sovereign nations rec-
ognized by and belonging to the United Nations. Some constitutional 
provisions are extremely eloquent, many very full and robust, others very 
simple, and a few merely structural or procedural, but it can hardly be 
said that protection of marriage as a basic human right in the fundamen-
tal charter or constitution of a state is unusual.66
 
1.  Substantive constitutional protection for marriage is common 
 
For example, Article 54 of the Constitution of Afghanistan provides: 
 
Article 54 [Family] 
(1) Family is a fundamental unit of society and is supported by the 
state. 
(2) The state adopts necessary measures to ensure physical and psycho-
logical well being of family, especially of child and mother, upbringing 
 
ing likelihood that state DOMA violates Bill of Attainder clause). 
64.  United Nations List of Member States, http://www.un.org/Overview/unmember.html (last 
visited July 23, 2005). The United States recognizes 192 independent nations in the world. See U.S. 
Dep’t of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Independent States in the World, 
http://www.state.gov/s/inr/rls/4250.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2005). The United States recognizes the 
Holy See/Vatican City as a sovereign state, but the United Nations does not (however, they do ac-
cord the Vatican Permanent Observer status). 
65.  Appendix I, infra; see also Wardle, SMAs, supra note 45 at App. I. All data about provi-
sions in national constitutions is referred to as “at least,” because a few constitutions could not be 
found, some were in foreign languages, and some marriage and family-protecting provisions may 
have been overlooked. 
66.  Id. 
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of children and the elimination of traditions contrary to the principles of 
the sacred religion of Islam.67
Some European nations have similar provisions. For example, Arti-
cle 6 of the German Constitution provides: 
 
[Marriage and family, illegitimate children] 
(1) Marriage and family enjoy the special protection of the state. 
(2) Care and upbringing of children are the natural right of the parents 
and duty primarily incumbent on them. The state watches over the per-
formance of this duty. 
(3) Separation of children from the family against the will of the per-
sons entitled to bring them up may take place only pursuant to a law, if 
those so entitled fail in their duty or if the children are otherwise threat-
ened with neglect.68
 
At least seventy-eight national constitutions—nearly 57% of the na-
tional constitutions that refer to families or marriage, and governing 
more than 40% of the sovereign nations of the world—contain explicit, 
substantive provisions identifying marriage as a fundamental and pro-
tected relationship, defining marriage, or providing protection for mar-
riage.69
Provisions in the national constitutions of at least thirty-two nations 
could be labeled “Defense of Marriage Act” (DOMA) provisions be-
cause they either explicitly define marriage as the union of man and 
woman (twenty-one nations),70 or very strongly indicate that marriage is 
the union of a man and a woman (eleven nations).71 Thus, nearly one-
sixth of the sovereign nations of the world already have adopted mar-
riage provisions similar to those suggested in the proposed Federal Mar-
riage Protection Amendment. 
The national constitutions of nearly 10% of the nations of the earth 
explicitly define marriage as the union of man and woman. For example, 
67.  AFG. CONST. art. 54, at http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/af00000_.html (last visited 
Aug. 1, 2005). 
68.  F.R.G. CONST. art. 6, at http://www.psr.keele.ac.uk/docs/german.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 
2005). 
69.  See Appendix I. 
70.  See BELR. CONST. art. 32; BRAZ. CONST. art. 226; BULG. CONST. art. 46; BURK. FASO 
CONST. art. 23; CAMBODIA CONST. art. 45; COLUM. CONST. art. 42; ECUADOR CONST. art. 33; 
HOND. CONST. art. 112; JAPAN CONST. art. 24; LATVIA CONST., art 110 (amended Dec. 15, 2005); 
LITH. CONST. art. 31 MOLD. CONST. art. 48; NICAR. CONST. art. 72; PARA. CONST. arts. 49, 51, 52; 
POL. CONST. art. 18; TAJ. CONST. art. 33; TURKM. CONST. art. 25; UGANDA CONST. art. 31; UKR. 
CONST. art. 51; VENEZ. CONST. art. 77. 
71.  See ARM. CONST. art. 32; AZER. CONST. art. 34; P.R.C. CONST. art. 49; CUBA CONST. art. 
43; ERI. CONST. art. 22; ETH. CONST. art. 34; MONG. CONST. art. 16; NAMIB. CONST. art. 14; PERU 
CONST. art. 5; SOMAL. CONST. art. 2.7; SURIN. CONST. art. 35; VIETNAM CONST. art. 64. 
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Article 32 of the Constitution of Belarus spells out protection of marriage 
as follows: 
 
Article 32 [Marriage, Family] 
(1) Marriage, the family, motherhood, fatherhood, and childhood shall 
be under the protection of the State. 
(2) On reaching the age of consent, women and men shall have the right 
to enter into marriage on a voluntary basis and start a family. A hus-
band and wife shall be equal in family relationships. . . .72
 
The Constitution of Brazil also is quite detailed in its constitutional 
protection and definition of marriage: 
 
Article 226 [Family] 
The family, the foundation of society, enjoys special protection from 
the state. 
(1) Marriage is civil and the marriage ceremony is free of charge. 
(2) Religious marriage has civil effects, in accordance with the law. 
(3) For purposes of protection by the State, the stable union between a 
man and a woman is recognized as a family entity, and the law shall fa-
cilitate conversion of such entity into marriage. 
(4) The community formed by either parent and their descendants is 
also considered as a family entity. 
(5) The rights and duties of marital society shall be exercised equally 
by the man and by the woman. 
(6) Civil marriage may be dissolved by divorce, after prior legal separa-
tion for more than one year in the cases set forth by the law, or after 2 
years of proven de facto separation.73
 
The specific composition and definitional requirements of marriage 
are described in Article 46 of the Constitution of Bulgaria: 
 
Article 46 [Matrimony] 
(1) Matrimony is a free union between a man and a woman. Only a 
civil marriage shall be legal. 
(2) Spouses shall have equal rights and obligations in matrimony and 
the family. 
(3) The form of a marriage, the conditions and procedure for its conclu-
sion and termination, and all private and material relations between the 
72.  BELR. CONST. art. 32, available at http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/bo00000_.html 
(last visited Aug. 1, 2005) (emphasis added). 
73.  BRAZ. CONST., supra note 71 (emphasis added). 
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spouses shall be established by law.74
 
Likewise, the Constitution of Honduras provides: 
 
Article 112: 
Se reconoce el derecho del hombre y de la mujer a contraer matrimo-
nio, asi como la equaldad juridica de lost conjuges. (“The right of man 
and woman to contract marriage is recognized, as is the juridical 
equality of married persons.”)75
 
The Constitution of Cambodia provides that “Marriage shall be . . . 
based on the principle of mutual consent between one husband and one 
wife.”76 Likewise, the Constitution of Colombia declares that the family 
“is formed . . . by the free decision of a man and woman to contract mat-
rimony . . . .”77 Japan provides that: “Marriage shall be based only on the 
mutual consent of both sexes . . . .”78 The Constitution of Lithuania pro-
vides that “[m]arriage shall be entered into upon the free consent of man 
and woman.”79 The Constitution of Mongolia affirms that “[m]en and 
women enjoy equal rights in . . . marriage. Marriage is based on the 
equality and mutual consent of the spouses who have reached the age de-
termined by law.”80 Poland declares, “Marriage, being a union of a man 
and a woman . . . shall be placed under the protection and care of the Re-
public of Poland.”81 The Constitution of Ukraine, also explicitly pro-
vides: “Marriage is based on the free consent of a woman and a man.”82 
74.  BULG. CONST. art. 46, at http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/bu00000_.html (last visited 
Aug. 1, 2005) (emphasis added). 
75.  HOND. CONST. art. 112, available at http://www.honduras.net/honduras_constitution. 
html (last visited Apr. 12, 2006) (English translation provided by Google, available at 
http://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=es&u=http://www.honduras.net/honduras_constitu-
tion.html&prev=/search%3Fq%3DHonduras%2Bconstitution%26hl%3Den%26lr%3D%26sa%3DG. 
(last visited Apr. 12, 2006) (emphasis added). 
76.  CAMBODIA CONST. (Annotated) art. 45, available at http://www.cambodian-
parliament.org/english/Constitution_files/constitution.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2005) (emphasis 
added). 
77.  COLOM. CONST. art. 42, available at http://www.georgetown.edu/pdba/Constitutions 
/Colombia/col91.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2005) (emphasis added). 
78.  JAPAN CONST. art. 24, available at http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/ja00000_.html 
(last visited Apr. 12, 2006) (emphasis added). 
79.  LITH. CONST. art. 38 (3), available at http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/lh00000_.html 
(last visited Oct. 20, 2005) (emphasis added). 
80.  MONG. CONST. art. 16 (11), available at http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/mg00000_. 
html (last visited Oct. 20, 2005). 
81.  POL. CONST. art. 18, available at http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/pl00000_.html (last 
visited Aug. 1, 2005) (emphasis added). 
82.  UKR. CONST. art. 51, available at http://www.rada.kiev.ua/const/conengl.htm (last vis-
ited Aug. 1, 2005)(emphasis added). 
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These are just some examples of the many clear provisions in national 
constitutions that unequivocally define marriage constitutionally as the 
union of a man and a woman. 
While not explicitly declaring that marriage is only the union of a 
man and a woman, other national constitutions clearly indicate that both 
sexes are included in marriage. For example, Article 32 of the Constitu-
tion of Armenia provides: 
 
The family is the natural and fundamental cell of society. Family, 
motherhood, and childhood are placed under the care and protection of 
society and the state.  Women and men enjoy equal rights when enter-
ing into marriage, during marriege[sic], and in the course of divorce.83
 
Many provisions refer to “husband and wife,” suggesting dual-
gender marriage. For example, the Constitution of the People’s Republic 
China provides, “(1) Marriage, the family, and mother and child are pro-
tected by the State. (2) Both husband and wife have the duty to practice 
family planning.”84 The Constitution of Cuba declares, “Marriage is the 
legal basis of the family, and rests upon absolute equality of rights of 
both husband and wife.”85 In Namibia, the Constitution declares that 
“[m]en and women of full age . . . shall have the right to marry and to 
found a family.”86 The Constitution of Somalia provides: “Men and 
women have equal rights and responsibilities. This included equal rights 
and responsibilities in marriage . . . .”87 In Vietnam, the Constitution 
provides: “Marriage shall conform to the principles of free consent, pro-
gressive union, monogamy and equality between husband and wife.”88
Additionally, many national constitutions have provisions underscor-
ing the dual-gender nature of the family, such as expressing protection 
83.  ARM. CONST. art. 32, available at http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/am00000_.html 
(last visited Aug. 1, 2005) (emphasis added). 
84.  P.R.C. CONST. art. 49, available at http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/ch00000_.html 
(last visited Aug. 1, 2005) (emphasis added). 
85.  CUBA CONST. art. 43 (1992), available at http://www.cubanet.org/ref/dis/const_92_e.htm 
(last visited August 1, 2005) (emphasis added); see also id. art. 36 (“ARTICLE 36. Marriage is the 
voluntarily established union between a man and a woman, who are legally fit to marry, in order to 
live together. It is based on full equality of rights and duties for the partners, who must see to the 
support of the home and the integral education of their children through a joint effort compatible 
with the social activities of both. . . .”) at http://www.parlamentocubano.cu/espanol/const.ingles (last 
visited Apr. 12, 2006). 
86.  NAMIB. CONST. art. 14, available at http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/wa00000_.html 
(last visited Aug. 1, 2005) (emphasis added). 
87.  SOMAL. CONST. art. 2.7 (Draft), available at http://www.cubanet.org/ref/dis/const_92_e. 
htm (last visited August 1, 2005) (emphasis added); see also http://www.civicwebs.com/cwvlib 
/africa/somalia/1995/reunification/appendix_1.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2006). 
88.  VIETNAM CONST. art. 64, available at http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/vm00000_.html 
(last visited Aug. 1, 2005) (emphasis added). 
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for and commitment to motherhood, parenting, or parent-child rights and 
relationships.89 For instance, Articles 41 of the Constitution of Slovakia 
and 51 of the Constitution of Ukraine provide: 
 
Article 41 
(1) Marriage, parenthood, and the family are under the protection of the 
law. The special protection of children and minors is guaranteed. 
(2) Special care, protection in labor relations, and adequate working 
conditions are guaranteed to women during the period of pregnancy.90
 
Article 51 
Marriage is based on the free consent of a woman and a man. Each of 
the spouses has equal rights and duties in the marriage and family. Par-
ents are obliged to support their children until they attain the age of ma-
jority. Adult children are obliged to care for their parents who are inca-
pable of work. The family, childhood, motherhood and fatherhood are 
under the protection of the State.91
 
Similarly, Article 46 of the Constitution of Vietnam provides: 
 
It is the responsibility of the State, society, the family and the citizen to 
ensure care and protection for mothers and children; to carry into effect 
the population programme and family planning.92
 
As the last two examples indicate, many nations have multiple provi-
sions protecting family, and/or marriage, and/or motherhood, and/or par-
enting, and/or defining marriage as a dual-gender institution. 
Thus, it is hardly novel for the citizens of a nation to include protec-
tion for marriage and family in the foundational legal documents of the 
country. In fact, such provisions are the norm in the constitutions of the 
nations of the world. Since protection for the institution of marriage in 
constitutional provisions is not rare or novel, it is surprising, if not ironic, 
that the United States, which has the oldest Constitution still in use in the 
world,93 and is the historic leader among nations in adopting constitu-
89.  See Appendix I. 
90.  SLOVK. CONST. art. 41, available at http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/lo00000_.html 
(last visited Aug. 1, 2005). 
91.  UKR. CONST. art. 51, available at http://www.rada.kiev.ua/const/conengl.htm (emphasis 
added). 
92.  VIETNAM CONST. art. 40, available at http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/vm00000_. 
html; see also supra note 82 and accompanying text (specific protection of male-female marriage). 
93.  This does not include the Legis Statutae Reipublica San Marino, sometimes considered 
part of the constitution of San Marino, which was adopted in 1600 and reportedly is still in effect 
(though it is very difficult to find a copy of it). The Electoral Law of San Marino, November 18, 
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tional protections for valued basic rights, principles, relationships, and 
institutions, has no constitutional provision explicitly recognizing or pro-
viding protection for the institution of marriage. 
 
2.  Constitutions of nations with federal governments protect marriage 
and families 
 
One of the objections to adoption of an FMPA to the Constitution of 
the United States is the federal design of the United States’s government. 
However, many other nations with federal systems of government have 
provisions in their national constitutions that provide specific protections 
for family and marriage. Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Germany, 
India, Mexico, Nigeria, Switzerland, and Venezuela, are the ten nations 
(besides the United States) with the most clearly federal forms of gov-
ernment.94 The Constitutions of most of these nations (Argentina,95 Bra-
zil,96 Germany,97 Mexico,98 Nigeria,99 and Venezuela)100 contain explicit 
substantive protection for marriage and/or family. That fact alone sug-
gests that the principle of federalism is not inconsistent with substantive 
constitutional protection for marriage and family. 
However, comparative analysis requires deeper examination, for 
there are many different forms of federalism. The American form of fed-
eralism has a long tradition of strong national deference to, and respect 
for, the primacy of state regulation of domestic relations. By contrast, the 
federal systems in several countries appear to give the national govern-
ment primary, if not plenary, authority to regulate marriage and family 
law. For example in Argentina,101 Brazil,102 and Switzerland103 it appears 
 
1926, appears to have substantially supplemented if not superceded much of it. See generally Gis-
berth H. Flanz, San Marino, in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 1, 1 (Albert P. 
Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds. 1975) (“The tiny Republic of San Marino does not have a codified 
constitution but the foundations of its impressive constitutional tradition can be traced back more 
than a thousand years.”); United Nations Development Programme, Attitudes on Women’s Rights in 
San Marino, available at http://www.sdnp.undp.org/ww/women-rights/msg00007.html (San Marino 
has no constitution). 
94.  See generally Siegfried Wiessner, The Movement Toward Federalism in Italy: A Policy-
Oriented Perspective, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 301, 302 (2002); Ahmed T. el-Gaili, Note, Federal-
ism and the Tyranny of Religious Majorities: Challenges to Islamic Federalism in Sudan, 45 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 503, 513 (2004); see also Siegfried Wiessner, Federalism: An Architecture for Freedom, 1 
NEW EUROPE L. REV. 129 (1993).
95.  ARG. CONST. §§ 14(3) & 20. 
96.  BRAZ. CONST. art. 226. 
97.  F.R.G. CONST. art. 6. 
98.  MEX. CONST. art. 3. 
99.NIG. CONST. art. 17 (3), 262, 272. 
100.  VENEZ. CONST. arts. 75-81. 
101. U.S. State Dep’t. Country Reports, Argentina, available at http://www.state.gov/ 
r/pa/ei/bgn/26516.htm; Guide to the Argentine Executive, Legislative and Judicial System, July 15, 
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that the national constitution and legislature set the substantive rules 
governing marriage and family relations, but the provincial or state 
courts appear to have primary jurisdiction for implementation and inter-
pretation of those rules. Australia,104 Canada,105 Germany,106 Mexico,107 
and Nigeria108 have systems of “shared competence” in the regulation of 
marriage and family law in which both the national and the state or pro-
vincial governments have the authority to regulate specific legal relation-
ships or aspects of relationship. For example, in Australia, the national 
government has authority to regulate marriage and divorce while the 
states have authority over children, adoption, and child protection.109 In 
Canada, the national government has authority under the Charter of 
Rights to enact substantive regulations of marriage and divorce, while 
the provinces have authority over form, solemnization, and property is-
 
2001, http://www.llrx.com/features/argentina.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2006); Argentine Legal Sys-
tem and Structure, http://faculty.cua.edu/fischer/ComparativeLaw2002/bauesachs/ArgentinaMain 
WebPage.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2006); see also Kenneth Rosenn, Federalism in the Americas in 
Comparative Perspective, 26 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1, 18 (1994) (“The Constitutions of 
Argentina, Brazil, Canada, and Venezuela confer the powers to regulate criminal and family law on 
the federal government; in Mexico and the U.S., these powers belong to the states under the residual 
clauses. These allocations, however, are not in practice mutually exclusive divisions of power. The 
federal governments of the U.S. and Mexico invade both these areas of state preserves. Similarly, the 
Argentine and Canadian provinces and the Brazilian states invade the federal domain of criminal 
law.”).
102. U.S. Dept. of State, Country Reports, Brazil, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35640.html 
(last visited Feb. 10, 2006). 
103.  See generally Barbara Graham-Siegenthaler, International Marriage and Divorce Regu-
lations and Recognition in Switzerland, 29 FAM. L. Q. 685, 686 (1995); Fridolin M.R. Walther, In-
troduction to the Swiss Legal System: A Guide for Foreign Researchers, LLRX.com, 
http://www.llrx.com/features/swiss.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2006). 
104.  See AUSTL. CONST., available at http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/as__indx.html; see 
also Patrick Parkinson, The Law of Postseparation Parenting in Australia, 39 FAM. L. Q. 507, 508 
(2005) (describing division of authority to regulate family law between Australian federal and state 
governments); Sylvia Law, Families and Federalism, 4 WASH. UNIV. J. L. & POL’Y. 175, 181 
(2000) (Australia, Canada, Germany, and Switzerland have different federal structures giving na-
tional government more authority over family law than the states). 
105.  See Constitution Act, 1867, Constitution Act, 1871, Constitution Act, 1982, and Cana-
dian Human Rights Act, available at http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/ca__indx.html (last visited 
Feb. 10, 2006); see also Carol Rogerson, The Canadian Law of Spousal Support, 38 FAM. L. Q. 69, 
74 n.12 (2004) (describing Canadian allocation of authority to regulate family law between the fed-
eral and provincial governments); Law, supra note 105, at 181 (Canada is one of several federal na-
tions giving national government more authority over family law than the states). 
106.  “In Germany, there is a strong national authority over marriage, but the states have some 
areas of regulatory hegemony.” Cultural site available at http://www.germanculture.com.ua/library/ 
facts/bl_federalism.htm states, “The federal government is assigned a greater legislative role and the 
Land governments a greater administrative role.” Id.; see also German Basic Law, Art. 6(1). 
107.  See Rosenn, supra note 102. 
108. See generally NIG. CONST. 1999, Chapter VII, 262(2)(a). Sharia competence to judge 
marriages and dissolutions. See also Marriage Act of 1990 XI, 218 and Marriages (Validation) Act 
of 1990, XI, 219 at http://www.nigeria-law.org/LFN-comprehensiveIndex.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 
2005). 
109.  See supra note 105, at § 51 (xx1-xxiii). 
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sues.110 In Germany, there is a strong national authority over marriage, 
but the states have some areas of regulatory hegemony.111 In Nigeria, it 
appears that the national lawmakers have authority to establish general 
baseline principles, but the states may adopt additional regulations (and 
thus, in Nigeria, twelve states permit Muslims polygamous marriages, 
but the other states in Nigeria do not).112 Mexican state authority has 
been intruded upon by the federal government.113 On the other hand, it 
appears that in India 114 and Venezuela115 the national governments have 
more central authority over domestic relations generally. 
Given the varieties of federalism in the nations of world, it is signifi-
cant that some nations from all parts of the spectrum of federalism in 
family law (including strongly national systems of federalism with strong 
national control of family law, shared competence system, and strong 
state/provincial systems of federalism with heavy state/provincial control 
of family law) have included substantive protection for marriage and/or 
family in provisions of the national constitution. This certainly suggests 
that substantive constitutional protection for marriage is not inconsistent 
or irreconcilable with vibrant federalism. 
The rich hybrid form of federalism embodied in the Constitution of 
the United States, with multiple threads of intertwined and balanced 
powers, multiple concurrent and overlapping areas of regulation, is per-
fectly suited for the federal definition of human rights baselines, and def-
erence to the states for detailed regulation within those broad parame-
ters.116 In short, the United States’ Constitution is perfectly suited to a 




110.  See generally Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, available at (last visited Feb. 10, 
2006). 
111.  Law, supra note 105, at 181(Germany is one of several federal nations giving national 
government more authority over family law than the states.). 
112.  Andra Nahal Behrouz, Note, Transforming Islamic Family Law: State Responsibility and 
The Role of Internal Initiative, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1136, 1145-46 (2003) (12 Nigerians states 
have adopted Islamic family law); Abdulmumini Adebayo Oba, The Sharia Court of Appeal in 
Northern Nigeria: The Continuing Crises of Jurisdiction, 52 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 859 (2004). 
113.  See Rosenn, supra note 102, at 18 (describing Mexican federal intrusion upon state regu-
lation of family law). 
114. INDIA CONST., Schedule I, Paragraph 3(1)(i), discussing marriage and divorce authority; 
see also List III Concurrent List, 5. http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/in01000_.html. This seems to 
indicate that there is control over marriage at a regional level instead of a national level. 
115.  VENEZ. CONST. ch. V art. 77 (national constitution provides that marriage between a 
man and a woman is protected) available at http://www.georgetown.edu/pdba/Constitutions/ 
Venezuela/ven1999.html. 
116.  To some extent, that collaborative baseline-detail division of regulation describes the 
regulation of religion in the United States. 
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D.  Express Protection for Marriage in International Covenants, Trea-
ties, Declarations and Multi-national Charters is the Norm 
 
It is also the common practice in basic international (global and re-
gional) charters setting multinational standards for protecting human 
rights to include explicit provisions protecting marriage and family. As 
Appendix II illustrates, dozens of international conventions, treaties, 
compacts and declarations contain explicit reference to and protection for 
marriage and family relations as a matter of positive international law.117 
For example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the 
United Nations General Assembly in 1948, declares: 
 
Article 16 
Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nation-
ality or religion, have the right to marry and found a family. They are 
entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its disso-
lution. 
Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the 
intending spouses. 
The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is 
entitled to protection by society and the State.118
 
It bears noting that the implication of the conjoined terms “men and 
women” as the holders of “the right to marry” and its linkage to “found a 
family” clearly indicates that marriage was understood by the drafters of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to be a union of male and 
female—not same-sex unions. The following non-exhaustive list of simi-
lar dual-gender language in numerous other international conventions, 
treaties, and declarations underscores the male-female nature of mar-
riage: The Preamble of the Recommendation on Consent to Marriage, 
Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages, provides 
“that men and women of full age have the right to marry and to found a 
family . . . .”119 Also, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), Article 9: “[States] shall en-
sure . . . that neither marriage to an alien nor change of nationality by the 
117.  Appendix II; see also Doha International Conference for the Family, Nov. 29-30, 2004, 
The Doha Declaration, U.N. Doc A/59/592 (Dec. 3, 2004). 
118.  G.A. Res. 217 (III) (Dec. 10, 1948) (emphasis added). 
119. Recommendation on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration 
of Marriages, G.A. Res. 2018 (XX) (Nov. 1, 1965) (emphasis added). 
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husband during marriage shall automatically change the nationality of 
the wife, render her stateless or force upon her the nationality of the hus-
band.”); 120 CEDAW, Article 16: “States Parties shall take all appropriate 
measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relat-
ing to marriage and family relations and in particular shall ensure, on a 
basis of equality of men and women: (a) The same right to enter into 
marriage.”121 Article 18 of The Protocol to the African Charter on Hu-
man and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa,122 requires: 
“States Parties shall ensure that women and men enjoy equal rights and 
are regarded as equal partners in marriage . . . .” Likewise, the African 
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, Article 18 establishes a 
duty “to ensure equality of rights and responsibilities of spouses with re-
gard to children during marriage.”123 Article 21 of the same Charter pro-
vides: “Child marriage and the betrothal of girls and boys shall be pro-
hibited.”124
Some international covenants are even more explicit in establishing 
the dual-gender nature of marriage. For example, Article 23 of the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides, “The right of 
men and women of marriageable age to marry and to found a family 
shall be recognized.”125 Similarly, Article 12 of the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms guaran-
tees, “Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and 
to found a family, according to the national laws governing the exercise 
of this right.”126 Likewise, Article 17 of the American Convention on 
Human Rights provides, “The right of men and women of marriageable 
age to marry and to raise a family shall be recognized . . . .”127
Thus, clearly expressed provisions of explicit protection for mar-
riage, including the dual-gender nature of marriage, are well-established 
in the foundational legal documents in international law. Protection of 
marriage by explicit provisions in basic human rights charters civil rights 
declarations, and standards of international conventions is the global 
norm and, as is typical, the extent of this protection is the amorphous 
120.  19 I.L.M. 33 (Dec. 18, 1979) (emphasis added). 
121.  Id. at art. 16. 
122.  Adopted at the Second Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union at Maputo (July 
11-Aug. 13, 2003); see also id. at (e)-(j) (listing specific legal rights as to which equality of husband 
and wife is required). 
123.  OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990) (entered into force Nov. 29, 1999) . 
124.  Id. at Article 21. 
125.  999 U.N.T.S. 171 (Dec. 16, 1966) (ratified with reservations by the Senate on June 8, 
1992). 
126.  312 U.N.T.S. 221 (Nov. 4, 1950). 
127.  1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 9 I.L.M. 673 (Nov. 22, 1969) (Signed by the United States on June 1, 
1977). 
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guarantee of “recognition.” Unfortunately, simply giving men and 
 
women the right to marry today may not always clarify that the union has 
a distinct conjugal meaning. 
 
E.  A Federal Marriage Protection Amendment is the Best Hope to 
Preserve Federalism in Family Law 
 
Some amendment opponents argue that adopting an FMPA will vio-
late and undermine the constitutional principle of federalism in family 
law. This is a one-sided argument; it ignores that federalism in family 
law already is being undermined by the growing number of judicial deci-
sions which, based on constitutional doctrines, are mandating legaliza-
tion of same-sex marriage or same-sex “civil unions” or “domestic part-
nerships.”128 Collectively, these decisions threaten to fundamentally 
undermine the principle of federalism in family law. They expand doc-
trines which lead to the imposition of a federal definition of, and federal 
interference with, state marriage and family laws; they intrude boldly 
into state regulation of family law without preserving any significant 
boundary or limitation for federalism in family law. In reply, advocates 
of same-sex marriage justify this judicial encroachment on state regula-
tion by citing at least eight broad constitutional doctrines to support their 
position.129 For their part, courts agreeing with same-sex marriage advo-
128. See supra Part III.B. (citing eight courts that have already ruled for same-sex unions). 
129.  These eight doctrines are as follows: (1) equal protection (see, e.g., Brause v. Bureau of 
Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562, 1998 WL 88743 at 6 (Alaska. Super. Ct., Feb. 27, 1998); Coordi-
nation Proceeding, Special Title [Rule 1550 (c), Marriage Cases, Superior Ct, San Francisco County, 
Judicial Council Coordination Proceeding No. 4365 (Mar. 14, 2005); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 
67 (Haw. 1993); Baehr v. Miicke, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. 1996); Goodridge v. Department 
of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 943, 959 (Mass. 2003); In re Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 
802 N.E.2d 565, 569-71 (Mass. 2004); Langan v. St. Vincent’s Hosp. of N.Y., 765 N.Y.S.2d 411, 
453-54 (N.Y. Sup. 2003); Hernandez v. Robles, ___ N.Y.S.2d ___, 2005 WL 363778 (N.Y.Sup., 
Feb. 4, 2005); Tanner v. Oregon Health Sci’s Univ., 971 P.2d 435, 443 (Or. Ct. App. 1998); Baker v. 
State, 744 A.2d 864, 879, 882, 885 (Vt. 1999); see also Li v. State, 2004 WL 1258167 (Or. Cir. 
2004)), (2) substantive due process (privacy, right to marry, right of association) (see, e.g., 
Brause,1998 WL 88743 at 4; Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 959-61; Andersen v. King County, 2004 WL 
1738447 *3,4,11 (Wash. Super. 2004); Hernandez v. Robles, ___ N.Y.S.2d ___, 2005 WL 363778 
(N.Y.Sup., Feb. 4, 2005)), (3) due process standards of arbitrariness or irrationality (see Goodridge, 
798 N.E.2d at 960; Andersen, 2004 WL 1738447 at *3, *4, *11-*12; see also Baker, 744 A.2d at 
882, 884), (4) privileges and immunities (see, e.g., Tanner, 971 P.2d at 447-48; Baker 744 A.2d at 
867; Castle v. State, 2004 WL 1985215 at *3, *4, *10-*13, *16 (Wash. Super. 2004); Andersen, 
2004 WL 1738447 at *3, *4; Li, 2004 WL 1258167 *1, 4-*7 (Or. Cir. 2004)), (5) full faith and credit 
(see generally Alons v. Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Lambda Legal, http://www. 
lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/cases/record?record=203 (last visited Feb. 10, 2006); Iowa Supreme 
Court to Hear Oral Argument Friday in Lesbian Civil Union Dissolution Case, Jan. 11, 2005, 
http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/news/press.html?record=1605 (last visited Apr. 12, 2006); 
DOMA State Grants Lesbians Divorce, 365gay.com, http://www.365gay.com/ newscon-
tent/120703iowaDivorce.htm (Dec. 7, 2003); Angela Geralds, Beaumont Judge Lifts Mens’ Divorce 
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cates have adopted at least six of these expansive constitutional doctrines 
in ruling in favor of same-sex unions.130 The use of such wide constitu-
tional premises to define marriage as a matter of judicial interpretation of 
constitutional doctrine and to impose same-sex unions on the states 
makes a mockery of federalism in family law and would effectively de-
 
Decree, DALLAS VOICE, April 4, 2003, in The Lesbian/Gay Rights Lobby of Texas, http://www.lgrl. 
org/news/article.php?newsID=25 (last visited Feb. 10, 2006); see also Richard W. Millar, Jr., Mil-
lar’s Jurisdiction—A Boon to Divorce Lawyers: Marriage Is No Longer A Prerequisite, 45-JUN 
Orange County Law. 8 (June 2003); Langan v. St. Vincents Hospital, 196 Misc. 2d at 449, 765 
N.Y.S.2d at 418 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Co. N.Y., 2003). But see Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d 941 at 948), and 
(6) the bill of attainder clause (Citizens for Equal Protection, Inc. v. Bruning, 290 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 
1008-11 (D. Neb. 2003)). 
Additionally, proponents of same-sex marriage have long invoked two other constitutional 
doctrines: (7) the free exercise of religion clause (see, e.g., Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589-
90 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973) (rejecting the claim of same-sex marriage applicants who claimed marriage 
law violated their constitutional right of free exercise of religion); Mark Strasser, Same-sex Mar-
riages and Civil Unions: On Meaning, Free Exercise, and Constitutional Guarantees, 33 LOY. U. 
CHI. L.J. 597, 598 (2002) (“arguing that Free Exercise guarantees preclude the state from maintain-
ing a same-sex marriage ban without a showing of probable harm,” and “suggesting that the fact that 
some religions recognize same-sex marriage provides yet another ground upon which to establish 
that states cannot meet their burden in justifying same-sex marriage bans”); see also Richard A. Ep-
stein, Of Same-sex Relationships and Affirmative Action: The Covert Libertarianism of the United 
States Supreme Court, 12 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 75, 112 (2004) (“For its part, it is not clear how far 
Lawrence will go either. The question of whether its logic will carry over to same sex marriages is 
unclear and it is highly unlikely that this Supreme Court will go so far as to overrule Reynolds v. 
United States, and find that the free exercise of religion (and freedom of association) should govern 
there as well.”)), and (8) the establishment of religion clause (see generally James M. Donovan, 
DOMA: An Unconstitutional Establishment of Fundamentalist Christianity, 4 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 
335, 373 (1997) (arguing that DOMA is an establishment of religion because it is prompted by no 
secular purpose); Kevin Metz, Book Note, 108 YALE L.J. 271, 273 n.8 (1997) (reviewing MICHAEL 
J. PERRY, TURNING RELIGIONS SHIELD INTO A SWORD, REVIEWING RELIGION IN POLITICS: 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND MORAL PERSPECTIVES) (“Perry argues that abortion could be banned on 
secular grounds without violating the nonestablishment norm, but that prohibitions of legally recog-
nized same-sex marriages cannot be.”); David B. Cruz, “Just Don’t Call It Marriage”: The First 
Amendment and Marriage As An Expressive Resource, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 925, 948 n.117 (2001) 
(noting that lawmakers citations of the Bible “are at least a highly problematic basis for law in the 
United States under the Establishment Clause.”); Gilbert A. Holmes, The Conversations About the 
Intersecting Institutions of Marriage, 4 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 143, 146 (1998) (“Professor 
Eskridge argued that several constitutional doctrines are violated when the religious aspect of mar-
riage dictates the legal policy of who has access to the marital institution. He suggested that First 
Amendment restrictions against the establishment of religion prohibit the use of religious beliefs as a 
justification for prohibiting same-sex marriages.”); see also WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY 
PRACTICE 120 (2002) (noting anti-gay sentiment is strongest where “fundamentalist religions” are 
strongest); Emily Taylor, Across the Board: The Dismantling of Marriage In Favor of Universal 
Civil Unions, 28 OHIO N. U. L. REV. 171, 171-73 (suggesting secular civil unions instead of mar-
riage because marriage is tainted by religious origins and excludes same-sex couples); Desiree 
Alonso, Note, Immigration Sponsorship Rights for Gay and Lesbian Couples: Defining Partner-
ships, 8 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 207, 228 (2002) (“according to the First Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution, ‘Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof.’ Separation of church and state is fundamental to the Constitution. The civil, 
legal recognition of partnerships should be separate from religious definitions of ‘morality’ and 
‘marriage.’”); Vicki L. Armstrong, Note, Welcome to the 21st Century and the Legalization of Same-
sex Unions, 18 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 85, 106 (2001) (citing establishment clause in support of le-
galizing same-sex unions)). 
130. See supra note 15, doctrines 1-6. 
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stroy what is left of that important principle of federalism. By contrast, a 
narrow, focused constitutional amendment defining and protecting mar-
riage could preserve federalism and cause much less radical alteration to 
that important structural principle. 
 
F.  Federalism Objections by Opponents of an FMPA and a Brief Reply 
(They Miss the Point) 
 
Among the objections to FMPAs is the complaint that it would dis-
tort the allocation of powers between the national and state governments. 
The foundation of this argument is that American dual-sovereignty fed-
eralism was the structural device created by the Founders as a barrier 
against what they quaintly called “tyranny.” Federalism was intended to 
prevent the national government from accumulating too much power, 
and, thus, reduce the risk of abuse of power.131 However, the principle of 
federalism is not limited to the structural organization of the government 
and the allocation of powers between the national and state govern-
ments.132 The principle of federalism also under-girded the Founders’ be-
lief in the importance of preserving and promoting key nongovernmental 
institutions that preserve the diffusion and prevent the concentration of 
power.133
Principal among those institutions are marriage and the family be-
cause they foster the cultivation of the values and courage necessary to 
resist tyranny. The Founders believed the institution of conjugal marriage 
was critical to the maintenance and preservation of the constitutional (re-
publican) government the Founders had established.134 Today, the Con-
stitution still is a “superstructure” that rests upon the foundation of a 
“substructure” of nongovernmental institutions in which are nurtured the 
intangible human qualities or “virtues” (as the Founders quaintly called 
them) necessary to motivate individuals to make the sacrifices required 
to fulfill the responsibilities of citizenship and to willingly forego per-
sonal pleasures that cause detriment or disadvantage for the common-
wealth.135 Just as preservation of the sovereignty of the states is a facet of 
federalism necessary to prevent the accumulation and subsequent abuse 
of power, so also is the preservation of conjugal marriage and the marital 
family a facet of federalism critical to the prevention of tyranny. Mar-
riage-based families constitute mediating structures that resist tyranny, 
131.  For a detailed discussion of the history of federalism and how it can be reconciled with a 
FMPA, see generally Wardle, Tyranny, supra note 5. 
132.  Id. 
133.  Id. at 224-34. 
134.  Id. at 249-55. 
135.  Id. at 263-64. 
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and marriage is the foundation of the most important social unit of soci-
ety in which civic virtues, including the courage and commitment to re-
sist tyranny, are cultivated. Far from weakening the intended federal 
structure, the proposal of a federal marriage amendment will in fact pro-
tect federalism by preserving the institution of marriage from being sub-
verted by radical redefinition in the service of an extraneous political 
movement. 
Moreover, federalism in family law is not a monolithic principle of 
bright lines and sharp divisions.136 The fact that Congress and the courts 
have substantially, whether indirectly and directly, intruded into state 
regulation of family relations—including state regulation of marriage—
illustrates that the issue is no longer about the preservation of classical 
federalism. In fact, it is precisely because this state domain has been in-
vaded by incremental and inconsistent federal regulation that a FMPA is 
essential to stabilizing and buttressing the balance of power. 
Relatively recent jurisprudence clearly demonstrates, that the states 
no longer have a carte blanche in establishing domestic relations laws. 
For instance, in the past forty years, the Supreme Court has invalidated 
state marriage laws on federal constitutional grounds at least three 
times.137 In those cases (including Loving), the Court found within the 
U.S. Constitution some limits upon the states’ ability to set their own 
laws and policies governing marriage. Yet, none of those cases singly, 
nor all of them collectively, has eliminated or significantly undermined 
the constitutional principle of federalism in family law. 
It is not clear why opponents of a proposed Federal Marriage Protec-
tion Amendment believe that such a constitutional boundary will have a 
greater intrusive or undermining effect upon federalism in family law 
than the Loving decision. Both a FMPA and Loving draw federal consti-
tutional boundary lines around the basic social/legal institution of mar-
riage to protect it in ways that are critical to society and to the institution. 
Both Loving and an FMPA leave in place the power of the states to regu-
late marriage and family relations in all other respects, subject only to 
that particular baseline protection. Just as the Loving decision, which re-
jected an extraneous definition of marriage intended to promote “White 
Supremacy,” did not undermine federalism in family law, an adoption of 
136.  Wardle, Proposed FMA, supra note 5, at 173-83, 189-91. 
137.  See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (anti-miscegenation laws violate Equal 
Protection Clause and Due Process right to marry); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (law 
requiring judicial approval for support-obligor to obtain marriage license unconstitutional violation 
of Equal Protection Clause); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (prison regulation disallowing 
prisoners to marry unless prison superintendent found “compelling reason” to allow marriage uncon-
stitutionally is unrelated to legitimate penological interests and infringes upon the constitutionally-
protected right to marry). 
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the proposed Federal Marriage Protection Amendment to reject a radi-
cally new, ideological definition of marriage that promotes “Gay Rights” 
will not undermine federalism in family law.138 The Supreme Court’s 
constitutional precedents protecting marriage indicate that a Federal Mar-
riage Protection Amendment would not undermine federalism in family 
law. Rather, like the Loving, Zablocki, and Turner constitutional deci-
sions of the Supreme Court, the adoption of a Federal Marriage Protec-
tion Amendment will eliminate one threat against the institution of con-
jugal marriage without damaging the constitutional federalism principle. 
 
IV.  HOW TO ESTABLISH CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION FOR MARRIAGE 
 
Under the text and historic interpretation of the Constitution of the 
United States there are only three ways to establish constitutional protec-
tion for marriage against the threat of judicial, executive, or legislative 
initiative to radically redefine marriage to include same-sex couples. Ar-
ticle V established two different ways to amend the text of the Constitu-
tion. Judicial review provides a third option to amend the Constitution by 
judicial interpretation. 
 
A.  Congressional Proposal of Constitutional Amendments 
 
Article V of the Constitution of the United States provides two 
methods for initiating an amendment to the Constitution. The first, and 
most oft-used, requires Congress to take the initiative and propose a spe-
cific amendment by two-thirds vote in each house.139 The proposed 
Amendment must then be submitted to the legislatures of the several 
states, or to state conventions, as Congress chooses, and it must be rati-
fied by three-fourths of the states in order to become a part of the Consti-
tution. It is well known that most amendments to the Constitution (all of 
them except the twenty-first amendment) have been initiated by two-
thirds vote of both houses of Congress proposing the language. 
The problem is that this method of amending the constitution is anti-
populist and very pro-established-political order. It requires the approval 
and support of the existing elected legislators in Congress. It requires not 
merely their majority support, but a supermajority of 67% in not just one 
but both houses of Congress. Thus, if the proposed amendment threatens 
138.  Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
139.  “The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall pro-
pose Amendments to this Constitution . . . which . . . shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as 
Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the Several States, or 
by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as . . . may be proposed by Congress . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. 
V. 
    
439] CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION FOR MARRIAGE 469 
                                                          
the political interests of a significant minority of the members of either 
house (or, more frankly, the interests of the financial or popular support-
ers of a significant minority of the members of either house), it will not 
obtain Congressional approval. It will not be sent to the states for ratifi-
cation. It will die in Congress. This political establishment lethargy ex-
plains (at least in part) why only thirty-two constitutional amendments 
have been proposed in the entire 216 year history of the United States.140 
Since twelve of them were proposed together as the Bill of Rights in 
1789, it is more accurate to state that Congress has only proposed consti-
tutional amendments twenty times in over 200 years. 
Furthermore, in recent decades, the process of obtaining Congres-
sional approval for amendments has become much more difficult, as a 
practical matter. For example, in 1972, Congress proposed the Equal 
Rights Amendment (ERA)—and it failed to obtain sufficient state ratifi-
cations.141 Other than the ERA, in the past forty years Congress has pro-
posed only one additional amendment, the Twenty-sixth, lowering the 
voting age throughout America to eighteen years of age, and it passed 
Congress only because of a unique set of circumstances relating to the 
political realities of drafting young men for the ongoing Vietnam war 
combined with the invalidation of a popular law.142 Thus, in the present 
political climate, absent an extraordinarily unifying combination of 
forces, it is unlikely that two-thirds of either (let alone both) house of 
Congress will support sending a Marriage Amendment to the states in the 
immediate future. 
The prospect of obtaining Congressional approval for a proposed 
Federal Marriage Protection Amendment in the near future is extremely 
slim. Obtaining a supermajority in the House of Representatives would 
140.  Darren R. Latham, The Historical Amendability of the American Constitution: Specula-
tions on an Empirical Problem, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 145, 149 (2005); id. at App. A. 
141.  The Equal Rights Amendment was proposed in 1972 but failed ratification. Jason Ma-
zone, Unamendments, 90 Iowa L. Rev. 1747, 1838 (2005) (discussing failed proposed ERA). 
142.  The last amendment to be proposed by Congress that was ratified was the Twenty-sixth 
amendment which lowered voting age to eighteen during the Vietnam War. That amendment was 
first proposed in 1941, during the great second world war. When Congress passed the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965, lowering the voting age to 18 in all elections, the law was challenged on constitutional 
(federalism) grounds. President Lyndon B. Johnson called for the reintroduction of the amendment 
in 1968, and when the Supreme Court invalidated the voting age provisions applicable to non-federal 
elections in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), the 26th Amendment was reintroduced in 
Congress in 1971, passed Congress, and was ratified by the states in the shortest period of ratifica-
tion time of any amendment. LII, CRS Annotated Constitution, Twenty-sixth Amendment, 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/anncon/html/amdt26_user.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2006). Thus, even 
this “quick” amendment took 30 years to get through Congress; it is likely that it would not have 
passed despite the Vietnam War, if prior legislation reducing the voting age had not proven popular 
and then been invalidated by the Court. The next latest amendment to be proposed and ratified was 
the Twenty-fifth amendment, which was approved by Congress and sent to the states for ratification 
on July 6, 1965, more than four decades ago. 
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be difficult, but it is not impossible, given the strong grassroots support 
manifest for state marriage amendments, and the members of the House 
of Representatives’ political sensitivity and responsiveness to grassroots 
movements. However, getting through the obstructionist Senate would be 
next to impossible without a seismic shift in politics in the next two dec-
ades. Supporters of the Federal Marriage Amendment could not muster a 
bare, simple majority in the Senate in 2004, even though the vote was 
taken on a remote procedural issue concerning the invocation of cloture, 
not on the substance of the proposed amendment itself.143 The idea that 
another nineteen Senators would change sides and support a Federal 
Marriage Protection Amendment just two or four (or even ten) years later 
is highly optimistic (if not Quixotic). Thus, the prospect of getting a pro-
posed Federal Marriage Amendment through Congress and to the states 
(or conventions) in the next decade is extremely slim. 
If Congress could be motivated to pass a Federal Marriage Protection 
Amendment, it would then decide the method of ratification—by state 
legislatures or by state constitutional conventions. It is apparent that this 
decision would not be made without consideration of political factors. 
Since the Constitution of the United States itself was sent to state consti-
tutional conventions for ratification, only once has the state constitutional 
convention method of ratification been used, and that was when support-
ers of the Twenty-first amendment feared that the political heat on state 
legislators would be too great to get the amendment passed, so they 
chose to have the matter put to state ratifying conventions (selected by 
the state legislatures) where special interests (the liquor industry) could 
have greater influence than the populist teetotalers who would oppose 
repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment.144
 
B.  State Legislature Applications for a Constitutional Convention 
 
The second method of amending the Constitution of the United 
States authorized by Article V is by a process initiated “on the Applica-
tion of the Legislatures of two[-]thirds of the several States.”145 Upon the 
filing of the requisite number of applications of state legislatures, Con-
143.  See supra note 24 and accompanying text (vote in Senate on federal marriage amend-
ment); see also Letter from Lincoln C. Oliphant, Research Fellow at The Marriage Law Project to 
Alan E. Sears, & Glen Lavy, Alliance Defense Fund, Aug. 12, 2005 (copy in author’s possession). 
144. See generally George Anastapalo, The Amendments to the Constitution: A Commentary 
202 (Johns Hopkins U. Press 1995). 
145.  The Congress, . . . on the Application of the Legislature of two thirds of the several 
States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which . . . shall be valid to all Intents and 
Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the Sev-
eral States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as . . . may be proposed by Congress . . . .” 
U.S. CONST. art. V. 
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gress must “call a Convention for proposing Amendments . . . .”146 The 
proposed Amendment must then be submitted to the legislatures of the 
several states, or to conventions in the states, as Congress proposes, and 
it must be ratified by three-fourths of the states in order to become a part 
of the Constitution. 
The Founders of the Constitution were experienced politicians and 
understood how a political body dependent upon established powers and 
constituencies could become an obstacle to needed reform. This alterna-
tive process gives the states an equal opportunity—and burden—to pro-
pose needed amendments. Nevertheless, the Founders did not appreciate 
how establishmentarian Americans in general would become over the 
next two centuries (if they even imagined that the Constitution they 
drafted would survive as an operative legal instrument for over two hun-
dred years). They lived in the age of constitutional conventions. They 
embraced the opportunity to write and rewrite constitutions. They had all 
witnessed (and many had participated in) state constitutional conventions 
in all of the states for the purpose of drafting or ratifying state constitu-
tions. They saw (some participated in) the drafting of two national con-
stitutions within a period of less than ten years, including the Constitu-
tion we now use which was drafted by convention in 1787.147 They 
endorsed and created the process of ratification by state constitutional 
convention for approval and implementation of the Constitution of the 
United States. They expected further constitutional conventions in their 
own time, and the prospect of a second convention to propose amend-
ments to the Constitution motivated Congress to propose the Bill of 
Rights. Thus, the Founders probably did not anticipate how reluctant 
American citizens, generally, and American politicians, specifically, 
would be to use the second method of proposing amendments that the 
delegates in Philadelphia provided. 
This reluctance now represents a significant inertial obstacle regard-
ing provisions that have lain fallow since 1787. The Constitution of the 
United States is a very popular legal document, and there is much (per-
haps too much) concern that a “runaway” convention might, like the 
Philadelphia Convention of 1787 (convened to consider proposing 
amendments to the Articles of Confederation that ended up writing a 
completely new constitution), propose amendments that go far beyond 
the scope of the concerns that let to the calling of the convention.148 In-
146.  Id. 
147.  Eight days after receiving the Constitution from the Philadelphia Convention, Congress 
sent the Constitution to the states for their ratification. The other constitution, of course, was the Ar-
ticles of Confederation which was adopted by Congress on November 15, 1777, nine years and ten 
months before the Convention in Philadelphia approved the Constitution. 
148.  See generally Arthur H. Taylor, Fear of An Article V Convention, 20 BYU J. PUB. L. 407,  
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deed, the Bill of Rights was proposed in Congress in no small measure to 
quiet the movement for a second federal constitutional. In 1789, James 
Madison (who had argued against such amendments in the Constitutional 
Convention in Philadelphia,149 who had written against them in the Fed-
eralist Papers,150 and who described the task of drafting and getting them 
passed in Congress as a “nauseous project”),151 took the lead in Congress 
of drafting the Bill of Rights amendments. The anti-Bill-of-Rights Feder-
alist First Congress152 acquiesced because proposing the amendments de-
flated their opponents’ attempts to convince enough states to call for a 
second (amending) convention—which the Federalists feared might undo 
much of the great work of the Philadelphia Convention. It is clear that 
the fear of a convention motivated Madison and the Federalists to push 
the proposed Bill of Rights through Congress and send those proposed 
amendments to the States for ratification.153
Logically, several structures would prevent the overthrow of the 
Constitution by a runaway convention. For example, the result of the 
convention would be proposed amendments that would still have to go to 
the states for ratification, and which would not be valid unless ratified in 
three-fourths of the states.154 Nevertheless, a constitutional convention is 
something of a “black box”; its novelty entails so many uncertainties and 
disquieting possibilities that, politically, it is not a popular prospect. 
However, the potential value of the constitutional convention appli-
cation process should not be dismissed. State legislatures have passed 
and sent to Congress literally hundreds of applications for constitutional 
conventions in the nearly 220 years of our nation’s history.155 Some 
commentators have argued that the cumulative effect of that huge num-
ber of state applications for Congress to call a constitutional convention 
 
(forthcoming 2006). 
149.  James Madison, NOTES OF THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (1966, 
Norton reissue 1987). 
150.  The Federalist Papers, No. 38 (Madison); see also id. No. 84 (Hamilton). 
151.  James H. Hutson, The Drafting of the Bill of Rights: Madison’ “Nauseous Project” Re-
examined, 3 Benchmark 309 (Madison’s reluctance and political motivation). 
152.  See generally Richard G. Wilkins, The Structural Rule of the Bill of Rights, 6 BYU J. 
PUB. L. 525, 525-38 (1992); Paul Finkelman, James Madison and the Bill of Rights: A Reluctant 
Paternity, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 301-47; Leonard Levy, Bill of Rights 258-89 (1986); DANIEL A. 
FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 219 (1990). 
153.  See generally Finkelman supra note 153 (reviewing Madison’s ironic role as Father of 
the Bill of Rights); James H. Hutson, The Drafting of the Bill of Rights: Madison’ “Nauseous Pro-
ject” Reexamined, 3 Benchmark 309 (Madison’s reluctance and political motivation). 
154.  See generally Arthur Taylor, Fear of An Article V Convention, 20 BYU J. PUB. L. 407 
(forthcoming 2006). 
155.  Bruce M. Van Sickle & Lynn M. Boughey, A Lawful and Peaceful Revolution: Article V 
and Congress’ Present Duty to Call of Convention for Proposing Amendments, 14 HAMLINE L. REV. 
1 (1990). 
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is to put Congress under obligation to do so now.156 (The validity of that 
conclusion depends upon whether the issue is the weight of all applica-
tions for constitutional amendment conventions—whatever their sub-
ject—obliges Congress to call a convention for the general purpose of 
considering amendments, or whether Congress only has that duty when 
two-thirds of the states submit calls for a convention to propose amend-
ments dealing with the same topic.)157 Congress’ proposal of the Bill of 
Rights in 1789 clearly illustrates that “the mere threat posed by drives to 
call conventions for proposing amendments has a substantial in terrorem 
effect on the actions of Congress.”158 Congress has been stimulated to 
propose amendments by the serious prospect of a constitutional amend-
ment convention many times since the Federalists dominated First Con-
gress overcame their aversion to a Bill of Rights. 
This phenomenon has played an important role in American history, 
having prodded Congress into proposing several constitutional amend-
ments. The threat was a direct cause of Congress proposing the amend-
ments requiring the direct election of senators (17th Amendment), re-
pealing prohibition (18th amendment), limiting Presidential terms (22nd 
Amendment), and institution of the presidential succession plan.159
Proponents of a FMPA hope that Congress’ fear of a rush of radical 
amendments during a constitutional convention will now motivate them 
to propose a reasonable FMPA. 
Between 1789 and 1989, at least 108 different state applications for a 
constitutional amendment convention were sent to Congress by forty-
nine states.160 At least five other constitutional amendment convention 
applications have been submitted by states since then.161 Not long ago, at 
156.  Id. 
157.  Id. 
158.  Id. at 37; see also Conley, Amending the Constitution: Is This Any Way to Call For A 
Constitutional Convention?, 22 ARZ. L. REV. 1011, 1016 n.49 (1980). 
159.  Van Sickle & Boughley, supra note 156, at 37; see also Conley, supra note 159, at 1016-
17. 
160.  Van Sickle & Boughey, supra note 156, at 50. These authors argue that forty-nine states 
have at some time since 1789 (multiple times in most cases) submitted applications for Congress to 
call a convention for the purpose of proposing amendments to the Constitution. Id. at 57. The 
amendments have raised thirty-seven different amendment topics for consideration. Id. 
161.  See, e.g., Sen. Con. Res. 21, 140 Cong. Rec. S7954-06, 1994 WL 374839 (Cong.Rec.) 
June 29, 1994 (concurrent resolution from Missouri legislature calling for a convention to consider 
an amendment banning “unfunded federal mandates” upon the states); .Sen. Con. Res. 9, 139 Cong. 
Rec. S8226-03, 1993 WL 231800 (Cong.Rec.) June 29, 1993 (concurrent resolution from Missouri 
legislature calling for a convention to propose an amendment to prevent the federal judiciary from 
imposing taxes against the will of the people); Sen. Jt. Res. 3, 139 Cong. Rec. S3362-04, 1993 WL 
79737 (Cong.Rec.) March 22, 1993 (joint resolution from legislature of South Dakota calling for a 
constitutional convention for the purpose of proposing an amendment prohibiting the federal gov-
ernment from reducing the federally financed proportion of the necessary costs of any existing activ-
ity or service required of the states by federal law, or from requiring a new activity or service, or an 
increase in the level of an activity or service beyond that required of the states by existing federal 
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least nineteen state legislatures submitted formal applications for Con-
gress to call a constitutional convention for the purpose of proposing an 
amendment to the Constitution to overturn the abortion-on-demand rul-
ing in Roe v. Wade (during the 1970s and early 1980s).162 Thus, the ap-
plication by states for constitutional conventions may not be a “dead let-
ter” or “toothless tiger.”163 While political conservatism has prevented 
the Founder’s populist purpose embodied in the Constitutional Conven-
tion amendment method from being fully effectuated,164 the method has, 
nonetheless, served an important function in overcoming Congress’ es-
tablishmentarian, anti-amendment inclination. 
 
C.  Judicial Invention of Constitutional Protection by Interpretation 
 
The third method of amending the Constitution is both the least le-
gitimate and the very source of the problem regarding same-sex mar-
riage. It is “amendment” by judicial interpretation of existing provisions 
of the Constitution (or of constitutional doctrines based upon prior inter-
pretations of those provisions). 
Thus, one possible way to protect marriage is to begin a litigation 
campaign to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment as protecting the insti-
tution of conjugal marriage as a fundamental constitutional right and to 
declare laws legalizing same-sex marriage or marriage-like same-sex un-
 
law, unless the federal government pays for any necessary increased costs); Sen. Jt. Mem. 92-3 (joint 
resolution from Colorado legislature calling for a limited constitutional convention for the purpose 
of proposing an amendment prohibiting the federal government from reducing the federally financed 
proportion of the necessary costs of any existing activity or service required of the states by federal 
law, or from requiring a new activity or service, or an increase in the level of an activity or service 
beyond that required of the states by existing federal law, unless the federal government pays for any 
necessary increased costs); S. D, Jt. Res., 135 Cong. Rec. S3232-01, 1989 WL 172623 (Cong.Rec.) 
April 4, 1989 (South Dakota legislature calls for a constitutional convention to propose an amend-
ment requiring limited congressional terms). Several state legislatures have rescinded prior calls for 
a constitutional convention to propose balance budget and other amendments. See 135 Cong. Rec. 
S7909-01, 1989 WL 192944 (Cong.Rec.) July 13, 1989 (Nevada Assembly Resolution withdrawing 
its call for a constitutional convention to propose a balanced budget amendment); 150 Cong. Rec. 
H4580-01, 2004 WL 1369495 (Cong.Rec.) June 18, 2004 (Virginia House of Delegates withdraws 
all past resolutions of the General Assembly applying to the Congress of the United States to call a 
constitutional convention to amend the Constitution of the United States); 149 Cong. Rec. S6976-01, 
2003 WL 21207348 (Cong.Rec.) May 22, 2003 (concurrent resolution of Arizona legislature re-
scinding all of Arizona’s previous calls for a constitutional convention to amend the Constitution of 
the United States); 146 Cong. Rec. S739-01, 2000 WL 203887 (Cong.Rec.) February 23, 2000 (con-
current resolution from Legislature of Idaho rescinding all of its previous calls for a constitutional 
convention); 146 Cong. Rec. S81-01, 2000 WL 64632 (Cong.Rec.) January 26, 2000 (joint resolu-
tion from Oregon legislature rescinds call for a constitutional convention for the purpose of passing a 
balanced-budged amendment).
162.  See Appendix III. 
163.  Van Sickle & Boughey, supra note 156, at 37. 
165.  Id. 
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ions unconstitutional. Given the history of marriage at that time, this 
claim is not without some potential. This option also has some poetic ap-
peal, but it does not have conceptual appeal to the segment of political 
society most interested in protecting marriage. They are most inclined to 
favor “strict construction” of the Constitution and to reject as illegitimate 
the invention of new constitutional rights by judicial fiat. This approach 
also has the disadvantage of depending upon judges who are most in-
clined to utilize such creative construction of constitutional texts in order 
to favor same-sex unions. It is unlikely that they would be inclined to in-
vent or create conservative, pro-conjugal-marriage “amendments” to the 
Constitution. Rather, those more politically conservative judges probably 
would be the most resistant and opposed to such liberal, creative judicial 
interpretative approaches. 
 
D.  Lessons from Loving 
 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Loving v. Virginia is a compass for 
how to deal with the current constitutional crisis over the redefinition of 
marriage to allow same-sex marriage (or marriage-equivalent same-sex 
civil unions or domestic partnerships) in four ways. First, the court estab-
lished clear constitutional boundaries regarding state regulation (defini-
tion) of marriage.165 The holding of the Court drew a clear and bright line 
in constitutional law.166 It clarified an issue that needed clarification and 
settled an issue that needed to be resolved.167 It established a clear consti-
tutional boundary.168 Second, the decision of the Court and the principle 
of constitutional law it established was very focused and dealt precisely 
with one very specific, narrow point (antimiscegenation requirements—
165.  Some may counter that the Court did not establish any rule, but merely enforced a rule 
that the people of the United States had established when they passed the Fourteenth Amendment. 
However, the Court rejected that claim when it repudiated the State of Virginia’s assertion that the 
history of the debates in the Thirty-Ninth Congress showed “that the Framers did not intend the 
Amendment to make unconstitutional state miscegenation laws.” 388 U.S. at 9. The Court noted: 
“As for the various statements directly concerning the Fourteenth Amendment, we have said in con-
nection with a related problem, that although these historical sources ‘cast some light’ they are not 
sufficient to resolve the problem; ‘[a]t best, they are inconclusive.’” Id. (emphasis added); see also 
CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU, THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 60 
(Mid-America Press 1981) (“Among the people who ratified the Fourteenth Amendment there ap-
pears some understanding that [it], in its privileges and immunities clause, embraced the right of a 
person to marry whomever one pleased, regardless of race.”). 
166.  The Court declared: “There is patently no legitimate overriding purpose independent of 
invidious racial discrimination which justifies this classification.” Loving, 388 U.S. at 11. 
167.  “There can be no doubt that restricting the freedom to marry solely because of racial clas-
sifications violates the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.” Id. at 12. 
168.  “[W]e find the racial classifications in these statutes repugnant to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, even assuming an even-handed state purpose to protect the ‘integrity’ of all races.” Id. at 11, 
n.11. 
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defining marriage as an homogenous racial union only).169 Third, the 
Court’s interpretation of one aspect of marriage (disallowing racial re-
strictions, requirements, or definitions) clarified an important state pol-
icy-making boundary, but it did not noticeably undermine federalism in 
family law. Fourth, the decision prevented a fringe social movement’s 
attempt to “capture” marriage. The movement to legalize same-sex mar-
riage today is in many respects just the latest successor to a litany of so-
cial and political movements that have attempted to capture (and rede-
fine) marriage for the purpose of reconstructing society. Because the 
family environment wields such profound influence in society by model-
ing and transmitting basic social values, it has often been an attractive 
target for movements seeking to transform society. 
Two of the most well-know examples of social movements that 
“captured” marriage were the White Supremacy movement and its 
pseudo-scientific offshoot, the Eugenics movement. Both were very 
popular, politically influential, and extremely successful (especially from 
the Civil War until World War II) in persuading lawmakers to enact laws 
defining marriage to prohibit the conjugal union of interracial couples 
(anti-miscegenation laws), and barring the marriage of “idiots” and “im-
beciles” (and related regulations providing for involuntary sterilization of 
persons deemed a threat to a eugenically idealized gene pool).170 The Su-
preme Court decision in Loving v. Virginia,171 declaring anti-
miscegenation to be unconstitutional clearly repudiated the (mis)use of 
marriage laws to effect social revolution. The movement to legalize 
same-sex marriage is the successor to those earlier, discredited move-
ments which sought to promote their ideology by capturing, that is, rede-
fining, the institution of marriage. The need to establish a constitutional 
rule rejecting same-sex marriage is as great as the need to establish a 
constitutional rule rejecting anti-miscegenation laws. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION: PURSUING A THREE-PRONGED APPROACH TO 
PROTECT MARRIAGE 
169.  As to the right to marry, the Court held: 
To deny this fundamental freedom [to marry] on so unsupportable a basis as the racial classi-
fications embodied in these statutes, classifications so directly subversive of the principle of equality 
at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all the State’s citizens of liberty with-
out due process of law. The Fourteenth Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to marry not 
be restricted by invidious racial discriminations. Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry or 
not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State. 
Id. at 12 (emphasis added). 
170.  See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). See generally Paul A. Lombardo, Miscege-
nation, Eugenics, and Racism: Historical Footnotes to Loving v. Virginia, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
421 (1988) (review of racial and eugenic policies embodied in anti-miscegenation laws; law in Lov-
ing was also linked to law in Buck). 
171.  388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
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A Federal Marriage Protection Amendment is needed today to mani-
fest and establish the constitutional baseline for, and core meaning of, the 
institution of marriage. It should reflect the constitutional consensus of 
the nation. A constitutional amendment or provision protecting the insti-
tution of marriage is consistent with international constitutional practice. 
A constitutional provision or amendment also is consistent with the pre-
vailing international norm of human rights reflected in both international 
and comparative national human rights charter documents. 
An American constitutional marriage amendment is needed because 
without a clear textual resolution of the policy dispute, the issue will mi-
grate to the courts, which will (and already have begun to) creatively in-
terpret the Constitution. By default, American courts have begun to as-
sume the final decision-making function in settling hotly-contested 
political disputes that actors in the normal political processes do not 
seem willing to resolve. That practice weakens the integrity and inde-
pendence (in the long run) of the judiciary, thrusting it into political 
thickets that the courts were not designed to enter and which they cannot 
enter without becoming scarred by politicization, which, in the long run, 
destroy public confidence in and the integrity of the judiciary. 
There are three methods for securing constitutional protection for 
marriage. All three are difficult, and the prospect of successfully obtain-
ing an amendment protecting conjugal marriage and banning same-sex 
marriage by any one method seems very slim, at least in the short-run. 
However, the three methods are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, history 
suggests a synergistic effect when multiple approaches to amendment are 
pursued simultaneously. Therefore, I recommend that supporters of a 
constitutional amendment to protect the institution of conjugal marriage 
pursue all three avenues simultaneously and vigorously. They should at-
tempt to persuade Congress to propose a Federal Marriage Protection 
Amendment. At the same time, the movement should also encourage 
state legislatures to submit applications to Congress to call a convention 
on a Federal Marriage Protection Amendment. Finally, and simultane-
ously, activists and public interest law organizations should pursue 
claims in the court that would establish protection for marriage reflecting 
the substance of the proposed Federal Marriage Protection Amendments, 
by interpreting existing constitutional provisions and doctrines to estab-
lish baseline, definitional protection for the institution of conjugal mar-
riage and to ban and constitutionally prohibit the legalization of same-sex 
marriage or of same-sex civil unions. Because protection of the basic unit 
of society is so important to the people of America, and to their constitu-
tional system, sooner or later constitutional protection for marriage is 
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very likely to be adopted.  It would be better sooner than later. 
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Appendix I 
 
137 Nations with Constitutional Provisions Relating 
 to Family and Marriage172
 
(Research originally compiled by Scott Borrowman,173 March, 2005; 
supplemented by Joseph Wright,174 Kevin J. Fiet,175 and Lynn D. 
Wardle.) 
 
All references are to the Constitution of the respective nation. An as-
terisk (*) means the constitution refers to family but not explicitly to 
marriage; no asterisk means that the constitution refers to or protects 
both marriage and family; # means the provision is only structural; @ 
means the provisions are both structural and substantive. 
Afghanistan Art. 54. * 
Albania Arts. 31, 32, 53, 54. 
Algeria Arts. 48, 58, 63. * 
Andorra Art. 13. 
Angola Arts. 29, 30, 31, 40. @ 
Barbuda Prmbl., Art. 3. * 
Argentina Secs. 14(3), 20. * @ 
Armenia Arts. 20, 31, 32. 
Australia Sec. 51. 
Austria Art. 10 § 8. 
Azerbaijan Arts. 17, 34, 38, 127(6). 
Bahrain Art. 5. 
Barbados Prmbl. 
Belarus Arts. 27, 32. @ 
Belize Prmbl., Arts. 3, 14. 
Belgium Art. 21. 
Bolivia Arts. 158, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199. @ 
Bosnia-Herzegovina Art. II § 3. 
Brazil Art. 226. @ 
Bulgaria Arts. 14, 46, 47.  @ 
Burkina Faso Art. 23.@ 
Cambodia Art. 45. 
Cameroon Prmbl. * 
172.  See Lynn D. Wardle, State Marriage Amendments: Developments, Precedents and Sig-
nificance, 7 Fla. Coastal. L. Rev. 403, App.1 (2005). 
173.  J.D., 2004, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. 
174.  J.D. candidate, 2007, University of Kansas School of Law. 
175.  J.D., 2006, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. 
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Canada Art. VI(91)(26). 
Cape Verde Arts. 86, 87. * @ 
Chad Arts. 36, 37, 38. * @ 
Chile Art. 1. * @ 
China Art. 25.  @ 
Congo Prmbl., Arts. 34, 38, 39, 40, 58. @ 
Columbia Arts. 5, 15, 42, 43, 44. 
Congo Prmbl., Arts. 34, 38,39, 40, 41, 58. @ 
Costa Rica Arts. 51, 52, 53, 54. @ 
Croatia Arts. 55, 61, 62, 63, 64. @ 
Cuba Arts. 43, 44, 45. @ 
Cyprus Arts. 22, 111. 
Dominica Prmbl. * 
Dominican Republic Art. 15. * @ 
East Timor Secs. 17, 36, 39, 58. 
Ecuador Sec. III, Arts. 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38. @ 
Egypt Arts. 9, 10, 11, 12. * @ 
El Salvador Arts. 32, 33, 34, 35, 36. @ 
Equatorial Guinea Prmbl., Its. 5, 21, 24. @ 
Eritrea Prmbl., Art. 22. @ 
Estonia Arts. 21, 22, 24, 26, 27. * 
Ethiopia Arts. 34, 35, 36. @ 
Fiji Prmbl., Art. 29. * @ 
Finland Sec. 19. * @ 
Gabon Prmbl. @ 
Georgia Art. 36. 
Germany Art. 6. @ 
Ghana Art. 28. * @ 
Greece Arts. 9, 21, 93.  @ 
Guatemala Art. 1. * @ 
Haiti Arts. 259, 260, 261. @ 
Hungary Arts. 15, 66, 67. @ 
Honduras Arts. 111, 112, 113, 114. @ 
Iceland Art. 71. * 
Indonesia Art. 33. * 
Iran Arts. 10, 12, 21, 31, 43. * 
Iraq Art. 11. * 
Ireland Art. 41. @ 
Italy Arts. 29, 30, 31, 36, 37. 
Jamaica Art.31. * 
Japan Art. 24. 
Kazakhstan Art. 27. @ 
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Kyrgyzstan Arts. 26, 39. * @ 
Kuwait Art. 9. * 
Laos Art. 24.* 
Latvia Art. 110. @ 
Liberia Arts. 16, 23. @ 
Libya Art. 33. @ 
Lichtenstein Art. 15. * 
Lithuania Arts. 31, 38, 39. 
Lesotho Arts. 4, 11, 30. * 
Luxembourg Arts. 11, 21, 108. @ 
Macedonia Arts. 25, 40, 41. @ 
Madagascar Arts. 20, 21. * @ 
Malawi Arts. 13, 22, 23, 24. 
Mali Art. 6. * 
Malta Sec. 32. * 
Mauritania Prmbl., art. 16. * @ 
Mexico Art. 3. * 
Moldova Arts. 28, 48, 49. * 
Mongolia Arts. 16, 17. 
Mozambique Arts. 42, 55, 56. @ 
Namibia Art. 14. 
Nauru Prmbl. * 
Nicaragua Ch. IV, Arts. 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 
    79. @ 
Niger Art. 18. @ 
Nigeria Arts. 17, 262, 272. @ 
North Korea Art. 78. 
Oman Art. 12. * 
Pakistan Art. 35. @ 
Panama Ch. 2, Arts. 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59. @ 
Papua New Guinea Art. 1 [Prmbl.] * 
Paraguay Ch. IV, Arts. 30, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 57,  
  58, 59, 60, 61, 75, 92, 100. 
Peru Arts. 4, 5, 7, 24. 
Philippines Art. XV, Secs. 1, 2, 3, 4. @ 
Poland Arts. 18, 33, 41, 47, 48, 71. 
Portugal Arts. 26, 36, 65, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72. 
Qatar Arts. 21, 37. * 
Romania Arts. 26, 44. @ 
Russian Federation Arts. 7, 23, 38. * 
Rwanda Arts. 24, 25. @ 
Saint Lucia Prmbl., Ch. 1. * 
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Saint Vincent Prmbl. * 
Saudi Arabia Arts. 9, 10, 27. * @ 
Senegal Arts. 17, 18, 19, 20. @ 
Sierra Leone Art. 15. * 
Serbia Arts. 27, 28, 29. 
Slovakia Arts. 19, 41. 
Slovenia Art. 53. @ 
Somalia Art. 2.7. 
South Africa Arts. 15, 28. * 
South Korea Arts. 12, 36. 
Spain Arts. 18, 35, 39. * @ 
Sri Lanka Art. 27 (12).  * @ 
Sudan Art. 15. @ 
Suriname Arts. 17, 35. 
Sweden Arts. 2, 8, 13, 14, 41, 116, 119. 
Syria Arts. 44, 46. 
Tajikistan Arts. 33, 34. 
Thailand Sec. 80. * @ 
Togo Art. 31. 
Trinidad and Tobago Prmbl. * 
Tunisia Prmbl., Art. 41, 62. * @ 
Turkey Arts. 20, 41, 62. * @ 
Turkmenistan Art. 25 
Tuvalu Art. 4. * 
Uganda Art. 31. @ 
Ukraine Arts. 32, 51, 52, 63. @ 
Uruguay Ch. II, Arts. 41, 42. 43, 49. @ 
Uzbekistan Arts. 63, 64, 65, 66. @ 
Venezuela Ch. V, Arts. 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81. @ 
Vietnam Arts. 21, 31. @ 
Yemen Art. 26. * 
Zambia Prmbl. * @ 
    




International Treaties, Charters, Conventions and other Legal Docu-
ments With Provisions Concerning Marriage and/or Families 
 
(Research originally compiled by Scott Borrowman, March, 2005) 
 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 
Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, 
  and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery 
International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial  
 Discrimination 
Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and 
  Registration of Marriages 
Recommendation on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage  
 and Registration of Marriages 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against  
 Women 
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction 
Convention on the Rights of the Child 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda- 
 mental Freedoms 
American Convention on Human Rights 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man 
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Final Act (Helsinki 
 Accord) 
African Charter on Human and People=s Rights (Banjul Charter) 
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples= Rights on the  
 Rights of Women in Africa 
Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child of 1924 
United Nations General Assembly Universal Declaration of Human  
 Rights 
Declaration of the Rights of the Child 
Proclamation of Teheran 
Declaration on Social Progress and Development 
Declaration on Social Progress and Development 
Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons 
  
484 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 20 
Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and  
 Armed Conflict 
Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons 
Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Dis- 
 crimination Based on Religion or Belief 
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families 
Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam 
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women 
Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, Fourth World Conference 
 on Women 
Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
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Appendix III 
 
Applications by State Legislatures for Congress to Convene a Conven-




Ala. S.J. Res. 9, 1980 Sess., 1980 Ala. Acts 395, 9 Fam. Plan. Popu 
lation Rep. 54 (1980). 
 
2. Arkansas 
Ark. Res. Of Feb. 17, 1977, H.R.J. Res. 2, 6 Fam. Plan. Population  
Rep. 91 (1977). 
 
3. Delaware 
Del. Res. Of May 23, 1978, H.R. Con. Res. 9, 7 Fam. Plan. Popula 
tion Rep. 107 (1978). 
 
4. Idaho 
Ida. S. Con. Res. 132, 45th Legis., 2d Sess. 1980 Idaho Sess. Laws  
1005, 9 Fam. Plan. Population Rep. 55 (1980). 
 
5. Indiana 
Ind. S.J. Res. 8, Pub. L. No. 352, 98th Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess.,  
1973 Ind. Acts (Central), 2 Fam. Plan. Population Rep. 105 (1973). 
 
6. Kentucky 
Ky. H.R. Res. 7, 1978 Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess., 1978 Ky. Acts  
1401, 7 Fam. Plan. Population Rep. 107 (1978). 
 
7. Louisiana 
La. Res. Of July 16, 1976, S. Con. Res. 70, 5 Fam. Plan. Population  
Rep. 99 (1976). 
 
8. Massachusetts 




Miss. H. Con. Res. 3, 1979 Reg. Sess., 1979 Miss Laws 1137, 1138,  
176 See generally Lynn D. Wardle & Mary Ann Wood, A Lawyer Looks At Abortion 211, App. 
A (1982). 
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8 Fam. Plan Population Rep. 23 (1979). 
 
10. Missouri 
Mo. Res. Of Apr. 24, 1975, S. Con. Res. 7, 4 Fam. Plan. Population 
Rep. 129 (1975). 
 
11. Nebraska 
Neb. Res. Of Apr. 21, 1978, Legis. Res. 152, 7 Fam. Plan. Population 
Rep. 107 (1978). 
 
12. Nevada 
Nev. S.J. Res. 27, 60th Legis., 1979 Nev. Stat. 2014, 9 Fam. Plan.  
Population Rep. 19 (1980). 
 
13. New Jersey 




Okla. H.R.J. Res. 1053, 37th Legis. 2d Sess., 1980 Okla. Sess. Laws  
1205 (West), 9 Fam. Plan. Population Rep. 19 (1980). 
 
15. Pennsylvania 
Pa. H.R. 71, 1978 Gen. Assembly, 1978 Pa. Laws 1431, 7 Fam. Plan.  
Population Rep. 107 (1978). 
 
16. Rhode Island 
R.I., Act of Apr. 21, 1977, H.R. 5159, 6 Fam. Plan. Population Rep.  
91 (1977). 
 
17. South Dakota 
S.D.  H.R.J. Res. 503, 52d Legis., 1977 S.D. Sess. Laws 23, 6 Fam.  
Plan. Population Rep. 91 (1977). 
 
18. Tennessee 
Tenn. Res. Of Jan. 30, 1980, S.J. Res. 23, 9 Fam. Plan. Population  
Rep. 103 (1980). 
 
19. Utah 
Utah H.R.J. Res. 28, 42d Legis., Reg. Sess., 1977 Utah Laws 1317,  
1318 (Lorraine), 6 Fam. Plan. Population Rep. 91 (1977). 
 
